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ABSTRACT
This Thesis attempts to guage the effects, on Soviet-Western
relations and East European stability, of the conservative turn
taken by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in late 1990, early
1991. The signs of this move include: the repression in the
Baltics, Foreign Minister Schevardnadze ' s resignation, the removal
of other reformist leaders from Gorbachev's retinue, and the growth
of military influence. While apparently being negative for
prospects of continued good relations and stability, this
conservative turn was taken as a result of internal political
dynamics and not specifically as a reaction against the West or
against East European developments. Gorbachev, the x new thinkers',
and the foreign policy conservatives are involved in a power
struggle. The conservatives, the generals, have gained influence
and are now in a position to slow down but not derail the x new
thinking' diplomacy. The *Turn to the Right' signals an end to the
dramatic breakthrough diplomacy of 1989 and 1990 but is not a
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I . INTRODUCTION
Recent events in the Soviet Union, the so-called x Turn to
the Right 1 , are disquieting. Gorbachev is no longer the
reformer that he once seemed to be. The Soviet military, while
withdrawing from Eastern Europe, is on the move within the
USSR. 1991 Europe is a colder and more dangerous place than
that of 1990 or 1989. This thesis focuses on the nature of the
*Turn to the Right' and its implications for Western foreign
policy and the health of the East European revolutions of
1989. On the surface Gorbachev's "Turn to the Right" seems to
be a negative development for East European stability and
Soviet-Western rapprochement.
There is a power struggle going on in the USSR. Earlier,
with Gorbachev on their side, the reformists were at the helm.
As a result of their policies Eastern Europe was freed, the
Cold War thawed, and East and West came closer together.
Gorbachev has seemingly switched sides in the power struggle.
The aim here is, by examining Soviet political maneuvering, to
understand whether the influence of the conservatives has
increased, and how this might affect the foreign policy
achievements of the reformists.
Gorbachev's turn to the conservative side brings up
concerns that x new thinking' is over and old thinking has
returned. Is new thinking indeed dead? Has Gorbachev been
coopted by the right wing? Are the foreign policy
conservatives, the generals, on top? If this is a possibility,
what are upper-echelon military views on East European
developments? What is their ability to negatively influence
East European stability and the 1989 revolutions? What is
their ability to negatively influence Soviet-Western
relations? All these questions are evoked by Gorbachev's
maneuver. By examining the mechanics of the "Turn to the
Right" this paper attempts to answer first, if the right wing
has gained preeminence in Soviet foreign policy, and second
what the conservatives will be able to do with the increased
influence that Gorbachev's reliance on them seems to confer.
Before moving on, the conservatives need to be placed into
the context of the political debate in the USSR. The Generals,
and their allies in the KGB and the military-industrial
sector, are the empire savers. By virtue of self-interest and
belief the conservatives favor the retention of the USSR as a
multi-ethnic polity. Marshall Akhromeyev, for one, has said
that the army "was going to defend the constitution and the
unity of the state. "[Ref. 1] The conservatives are the
acolytes of "imperial consciousness" identified by Roman
Szporluk [Ref. 2]. They keep its flame alive. "An
"imperial consciousness" is alive in the USSR seventy years
after the death of the empire" [Ref. 3] and it is the
conservatives that cherish and sustain it. It is this group
that sustains "the legacy of Imperial Russia in current Soviet
politics." [Ref. 4]
"The right-wingers wish to imbue it [the state] with a
sense of mission, of manifest destiny rooted in an
imperial past. This does not necessarily mean that they
would see Russian armies carving out a new tsardom, but it
implies an antagonistic, aggressive world view at odds
with the basic theme of Gorbachev's *New Thinking', of an
interdependent world order. "[Ref. 5]
One of the problems with this legacy is its geographical
haziness. The Russians "lack any clear national identity and
consciousness ." [Ref . 6] The borders are not
universally understood and agreed upon.
"Not all Russians necessarily agree that Russia's "home"
is in Europe- or only, or mainly, in Europe. Just as they
had before 1917, the Russians are still debating the
question of their country's identity. . .all Russians [do
not] know what parts of the Soviet Union they understand
"Russia" to include, or whom they consider to be Russian
and whom not. Many conflicting answers to these questions
are currently being offered. Thus, some Russians seem
prepared to accept the "RSFSR" (the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic) as their narrower homeland
within the USSR. Others think of the entire USSR as Russia
- although not all of them necessarily accept all Soviet
citizens as their compatriots in
"Russia. ""[Ref. 7]
Because the borders are not fixed, as they are in most Western
nationalities' mindsets, the Russian approach to national
borders seems to be more one of gradually decreasing influence
as one moves away from Moscow rather than an abrupt legalistic
demarcation of the end of state power. This way of looking at
borders and influence, coupled with the maximalist
interpretations of what is Soviet or Russian common to the
conservatives, has destabilizing potential for the new East
European democracies. Whether the Western edge of the empire
is perceived to end at the Oder-Neisse or at the Bug is, for
example, central to conservative attitudes towards Polish
sovereignty. The Poles seem to feel that the unilaterally
announced Soviet withdrawals from their country are evidence
that "the Soviets feel free to come and go as they
please. " [Ref. 8] The Polish case is but one example of
the frictions possible because of the lack of clarity in
Russian definition of boundaries.
Having placed the conservatives in the context of their
beliefs on the x empire', another issue needs to be addressed.
It is the question of the relevancy of the Soviet domestic
power struggle. There are those that would argue that the
Soviet Union is so weak that its domestic political
maneuvering can be disregarded. They consider that, given
Soviet weakness, East European stability is not threatened
from that direction and that the West can ignore any
belligerent Soviet grumblings.
"It is not the growing debility of its external position
that creates the principal doubt over the persistence of
the threat that once confronted Western Europe, important
as the weakening of its external position undoubtedly is,
but the steady erosion of the Soviet domestic base. The
many developments - political, economic, environmental,
ethnic, ideological, and spiritual - that have marked this
erosion need not be entered into here. Almost every
conceivable pathology a society - and an empire - can
suffer from has now made its appearance in the Soviet
Union. "[Ref. 9]
The author of this quotation concludes from this "that the
Soviet Union will increasingly follow a passive and
contractive foreign policy and that it will do so whether the
government of Mikhail Gorbachev remains in power or not. In
either event, the retrenchment of Soviet power and influence
in the world will in all likelihood
continue.
"
[Ref. 10] As a middle term forecast this
seems eminently reasonable and probable. In such a future the
West ought to be able to act with relative impunity, following
the dictates of its own best interests. (Soviet and East
European experts would not be needed because the West can act
freely.) One would then, be able to choose policies based
solely upon Western desiderata. However the West will almost
assuredly not have this luxury. Focusing on Soviet decay is a
concentration on the mid-term. It ignores the short-term
because it ignores vestigial aspects of Soviet power. It
ignores the long-term because it ignores the potential power
inherent in Russia. "Even if it breaks up, Russia alone is a
huge Euro-Asian power and will not fit as an equal among
European peers.
"
[Ref . 11] Also, "Rear Admiral Thomas
A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, noted in
early 1991 that the Soviet Union" .. .will retain the world's
largest military machine. Despite the Kremlin's preoccupation
with domestic political and economic reform, modernization of
this vast military arsenal will
continue. ..." [Ref . 12] So, while agreement with a
diagnosis of decay for the USSR is reasonable, it is not the
whole picture.
In several decades one can envisage a Russian nation,
having survived the intervening difficulties, emerging to
realize the power inherent in its geographic position, its
wealth of resources, and its population. A tempered, stronger,
Eastern political entity could evolve. After all, perestroika
and the transformation of the military had as its "over-
arching goal... to propel the USSR into the twenty-first
century as a full-fledged superpower, with an armed force to
match. "[Ref. 13] The conservatives, such as the KGB
[Ref. 14], and Gorbachev's reformers shared this goal.
"Gorbachev and his colleagues did not labor to attain supreme
power in the U.S.S.R. only to expedite their country's
decline. They were seeking instead to ensure that the Soviet
Union would enter the 21st century, in Gorbachev's words, "in
a manner befitting a great power. "[Ref. 15]
Gorbachev's perestroika could be accepted by the
conservatives, the flag rank military officers and the KGB,
because it was a modern-day thread of Russian imperial
nationalism.
"Russian imperial nationalism has never been a reaction
against the dislocations of modernization. Rather, it has
been a modernizing ideology that aimed to "catch up and
overtake" technologically superior foreign powers to
enable Russia better to project its power abroad and
defend its territories. In this sense, Gorbachev's
original understanding of perestroika fell squarely into
the traditional pattern of Russian imperial nationalism.
Its aim was not to undermine ethnic stratification or to
contain the dysfunctions of modernity, but rather to




While long-term assessments of Soviet or Russian
revitalization smack of fantasy, given the seemingly endless
rot in the empire, prudence and Soviet military hopes for such
a future dictate its careful consideration. In the long-term
one has to ascertain which policies will be better for the
West given the possibility of a strong Eastern power.
More immediately critical is the behavior of the USSR
while it is in the process of decay. An observer of the
European security process cannot ignore the capability of the
USSR to do mischief, despite its decline. The Kremlin's
casting about for a role in the Gulf War was a clear
indication that it will not sit idly by and let the West
achieve its policy goals without accommodation to Soviet
interests [Ref. 17]. The Soviet leadership was not
able to get its peace proposals accepted, nevertheless their
insertion into the situation caused considerable concern for
the success of U.S. policy. Another clear instance of mischief
was the repression in the Baltics. The choreographed
procession of events was evident very early on. "The Kremlin's
campaign. . .seems to have followed an artful script with
precedents in Soviet political strategy dating to the
Bolshevik Revolution.
"
[Ref . 18] The crackdown has had
deleterious effects on Western security. It has, for example,
prompted a slowdown in ratification of the CFE treaty and
delay in negotiations on a new nuclear weapons
treaty. [Ref. 19] Clearly, action undertaken by the
Soviet Government, whether domestic or foreign, will be cause
for concern despite the decline in its power.
The short, mid, and long-term labels are useful to bring
some clarity to the discussion of threats emanating from the
USSR. It seems obvious that a 'mid-term 1 vision ignores the
threats created by vestigial Soviet power as well as those
attendant upon its likely eventual resurgence. The point, that
the threat is qualitatively different, is, however, well
taken. [Ref . 20] The old threat: the echeloned, tank
heavy, breakthrough and envelopment threat, that used to face
NATO is most unlikely. This should remain true for the short
and the mid-term. Yet one should not be deceived by these
divisions of time. The short-term vestigial Soviet power will
blend into the mid-term decay of the empire, or even until a
possible long-term resurgence. After all Soviet nuclear
weapons could remain a functional deterrent and a measure of
ultimate state power for some time to come and this despite
the vicissitudes of other measures of state power. What is
argued here is that, while noting the decline in Soviet power,
it retains sufficient potential to warrant ongoing concern and
evaluation. One cannot ignore the repository of power
remaining to the USSR. Given Soviet power, the question to ask
is: what aspects of the recent, and apparently negative,
changes in the USSR will affect Soviet-Western relations. Two
related trends come to mind, one the subset of the other. The
first is "Gorbachev's turn to the right" . [Ref . 21]
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The second is the increased influence of the high-ranking
military. An increasingly conservative government encompassing
a more forceful military component does not bode well for the
possibility of European stability and continued
democratization. The next two chapters of this paper treat
these two trends in the order that they have been delineated
above. The aim is to come to an assessment as to how much of
an impediment to good relations that these two seemingly
negative developments pose. With this assessment one ought to
be able to gauge the likelihood of Soviet obstructionism to
Western goals. For example, it will provide an answer to
questions of whether the West can, in light of Soviet
attitudes, successfully resolve the CFE deadlock, achieve
other agreements, and promote stability in Eastern Europe. The
next two chapters should provide an indication of whether
recent ominous events in the USSR are proof positive that
mutual accommodation is no longer possible. The fourth chapter
is an assessment of the Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern
Europe and their impact on potential Soviet conservative
leverage to be applied against the rest of Europe. The fifth
chapter is, of course, the conclusion.
II. THE *TURN TO THE RIGHT'
A consensus seems to have been built around the idea that
Gorbachev ' s turn to the right should be measured from his
rejection of the Shatalin 500 day plan for transition to a
market economy. [Re f. 22] With hindsight this may
indeed prove to be the point that history uses to measure
Gorbachev's change in course. Wherever the change is measured,
it is clear that he has indeed made a turn to the right. There
are several indications of this.
A. OVERVIEW
1. Personnel Changes
A dramatic indicator, or right turn signal if you
will, was Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation.
At the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1990, he
warned: "Comrade democrats, in the broadest sense of the word,
you have scattered, reformers have left the stage - and a
dictatorship is coming," he said. "Nobody knows what kind of
dictatorship this will be or who the dictator will
be."[Ref. 23] Shevardnadze criticized Gorbachev for
yielding to the right and for amassing tremendous power in his
hands. [Re f. 24] The Former Minister was tired, it
seems, of being criticized by the right, especially Colonels
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Alksnis and Petruschenko, without being defended by
Gorbachev. [Ref . 25] The fact that Shevardnadze was
compelled to proffer his resignation in public seems to be
evidence of Gorbachev's insulation from pro-perestroika
reformers. [Ref. 26] Gorbachev was almost certainly
distancing himself from criticism directed at his erstwhile
advisors.
Shevardnadze's case was just the most visible to the West,
of the turnover in personnel which happened in conjunction
with Gorbachev's sidling up to conservative forces. Former
Interior Minister Bakatin and Politburo Member Yakovlev have
both been ousted. [Ref. 27] The primary author of the
500 day plan, Shatalin, is also gone from the roster of
advisors to the Union President. [Ref. 28] Pro-reform
aides have been replaced one at a time, by conservative,
acceptable-to-the-hardliners, individuals [Ref. 29].
Bakatin was replaced by Boris Pugo at the Interior Ministry.
"Boris Pugo is a very, very tough cookie," says a U.S.
Official . "He is somebody who is out there to crush the
nationalities. "[Ref . 30] This was reported in
December of 1990, that is before the crackdown in the Baltics.
Pugo's newly appointed deputy is Boris Gromov, an Army General
[Ref. 31]. Gromov was commander of the 40th Army in
Afghanistan, and involved in planning the repression in
Azerbaijan in January of 1990 [Ref. 32]. This was the
same, purportedly charismatic, Gromov who, early in 1990, had
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voiced strong public opposition to Gorbachev's security policy
[Ref. 33]. Gorbachev is evidently coopting some of
his critics in his turn to the right. He is making them
responsible for nationalities security, something that will
be almost impossible to control. This Gorbachev tactic of
taking aboard one's critics and using them in precisely the
area of which they were critical has at least one precedent
[Ref. 34].
2. Presidential Power
Shevardnadze criticized Gorbachev for, among other
things, abrogating to himself immense powers
[Ref. 35]. Appealing to concerns of chaos, Gorbachev
called for increased executive power. "This reasoning [need
for a strong man due to the chaotic situation] is being used
to justify the recent strengthening of presidential
powers. . . * There are signs of the movement toward chaos, toward
anarchy, * Gorbachev told a recent meeting of
intellectuals ." [Ref . 36] Gorbachev seems to be
accumulating these powers in a x step-back-to-take-two-steps-
forward' tactic. "The new powers granted the Presidency form
the cornerstone of his short-term strategy. . .Designed to
gather conservative support for an emergency regime to
stabilize the situation, it seeks to create a second chance
for more measured reform, learning the lessons of the * first
perestroika' .
"
[Ref . 37] In December of 1990, "the
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Congress [of People's Deputies] approved virtually the entire
package of constitutional amendments sought by the president.
The laws create a powerful presidency with both executive and
legislative powers. The Cabinet is now subordinate to him
rather than to the parliament. A national security council is
now formed under the president. And he can now legislate by
decree.
"
[Ref . 38] Since the creation of the
presidency at the Congress of People's Deputies session in
March of 1990, Gorbachev has dramatically increased his
constitutionally based power [Ref. 39].
Shevardnadze's fears are understandable given the similarity
between Gorbachev's manipulation of the legislative organs and
the process leading up to and including the Enabling Act of 23
March 1933 in Germany.
3. Conservative Organs
Along with Gorbachev's increase in power, the
institutions he is now using have also gained in strength.
"The right camp has regrouped. As the Communist Party's
influence faded, the military-industrial complex appeared in
the limelight. . .but today it is starting to bring pressure to
bear on the political course of the state. "[Ref. 40]
The army is now being used alongside police patrols in many
cities [Ref. 41]. It has also been granted the right
to fire upon civilians in the event that it is threatened
[Ref. 42]. The Minister of Defense, Marshall Yazov announced
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on November 27th 1991 that the military would use force to
protect its installations, monuments and servicemen against
threats in the rebellious republics [Ref. 43]. The
KGB has been greatly strengthened [Ref. 44]. "It is
coolly amassing unprecedented legal authority and wielding
ever greater political and economic influence. . .Gorbachev has
given it vast power to combat economic and organized crime,
traditionally the Interior Ministry's turf. "[Ref. 45]
KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky has stated publicly that he
believes that the KGB leadership will continue to support
Gorbachev because they owe their positions to him. He also
noted the "leap in the KGB's importance since last October-and
it has grown even more since [former Foreign Minister Eduard]
Shevardnadze resigned.
"
[Ref . 46] In addition, the KGB
has added several combat divisions to its roster [at a minimum
the 103rd Guards 'Vitebsk' airborne division has been added
[Ref. 47]], creating in effect an organization
independent of the Interior Ministry, with the means of a
small army linked to a near monopoly on information
[Ref. 48].
4 . Media
Of concern to the West is Soviet rhetoric, reminiscent
of the Cold War, which is being heard in Moscow. Vladimir
Kryuchtov, the KGB chief made allegations that separatist
movements in the USSR had foreign backers [Ref. 49].
forces for ideas of dubious value in ameliorating the present
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situation [Ref . 50] . Soviet news reporting has
regressed to the point where, "The United States Ambassador to
Moscow ...assailed the main Soviet evening television news
program for reviving the old practice of blaming foreign
interference and connivance for Soviet problems. " [Ref . 51] The
fact that the Soviet media is saying such things bodes ill for
smooth East-West relations. What is worse however is the fact
that the government has reasserted control over the media. As
someone put it, "The Big Lie is back". [Ref. 52]
Leonid Kravchenko, "an orthodox Communist Party bureaucrat"
was appointed "head of Gostelradio, the state broadcast-media
committee.
"
[Ref . 53] Censorship has returned to the





Important as all of these things are, none of them have
the dramatic impact in demonstrating Moscow's turn to the
right, that the repression of the Baltic states evokes. The
night of 12 January 1991 left 15 dead, 64 missing, and over
100 wounded [Ref. 55] . The aim seems to have been the
capture of broadcast media in Vilnius, which was complete by
the 14th of January [Ref. 56]. By the 17th of January
the army had done little beyond securing the media hubs it
captured on the 14th [Ref. 57]. Television was then
used to spread the regime's version of events. The actions
which resulted in civilian casualties were termed defensive.
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In fact, Sajudis guards were blamed for firing first, when
Western and other sources at the scene maintain that Soviet
troops opened fire on unarmed civilians [Ref. 58].
Leonid Kravchenko, the aforementioned chief of Gostelradio,
said that, "Television should not be radicalized, either to
the right or the left," and when asked who determines "what is
radical and what is middle-of-the-road, he said, 'I
do. '"[Ref. 59] What is problematical about this is
that uncensored television and radio reports were allowed to
broadcast from Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city
[Ref. 60]. Likewise "there has been no concerted move against
the legion of foreign journalists that continues to
grow. "[Ref. 61] The implications of this indicate a less than
total commitment to the idea of a substantive crackdown. "If
the coup had been serious, telephone and other communications
lines would probably have been cut immediately and foreign
journalists expelled. But reporters kept arriving in Vilnius
throughout the crisis, with the Soviet Foreign Ministry taking
a remarkably liberal attitude toward enforcing travel
restrictions.
"
[Ref . 62] There seems to have been a
dysfunction between the harshness of military measures,
running over people with tanks, and the lack of concern of the
Foreign Ministry with these events being reported upon.
The attacks were undertaken under the flimsy legitimacy of
a * National Salvation Committee' which requested help from the
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army in preventing civil war [Ref. 63], The group's
members were not identified. It has remained a faceless cipher
[Ref. 64]. So called "salvation committees" were
formed in the other baltic republics [Ref. 65] . Riga
has been subject to the predations of pro-communist black
beret troops who attacked the Latvian Interior Ministry in
Riga, ostensibly because one of their member's sister was
raped [Ref. 66]. In Tallinn, bomb explosions rocked
the capital of Estonia [Ref. 67], All these
ostensibly unrelated events: the attack on the Vilnius
broadcasting station, the attack on the Interior Ministry in
Riga, and the bomb explosions in Tallinn, occurred on two
subsequent Sundays [Ref. 68]. This seems to have been
specifically chosen because most Soviet newspapers do not
publish on Sunday or Monday, leaving two days for the
repressive forces to act without press reporting and in which
they could get the jump on reporting their version of events
[Ref. 69].
6. East European Reaction
All of the events related to the crackdown in the
Baltics evoked memories of repression in that region and in
Eastern Europe and jitters over the similarity of methods.
Parallels have been drawn between the Baltic repression and
repression in Eastern Europe [Ref. 70]. "The official
Soviet explanation for the military intervention in
Lithuania. . .strongly resembles official explanations by
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[Gorbachev's] predecessors of the invasions of Hungary in
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in
1979." [Ref. 71] "Miklos Vasarhelyi, a member of the Hungarian
Parliament's foreign relations committee and a veteran of the
1956 revolt" said, "Everybody is a bit afraid, and very
cautious"
.
[Ref . 72] Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary, while condemning the Soviet measures were very
careful to give a measured response, one that would not unduly
irritate the USSR [Ref. 73]. The Soviets used a
similar tactic in the Baltics that had been used earlier, in
that they tried to portray a situation of civil anarchy into
which their troops had to be inserted to restore order
[Ref. 74]. "The strategy is to create the impression that two
popular groups are warring for power in Lithuania, [the
Sajudis dominated parliament and the Committee of National
Salvation] and that the only solution is for President Mikhail
S. Gorbachev reluctantly to impose direct Kremlin
rule. "[Ref. 75] Commentary in "Soviet Analyst"
generalized the behavior into a general recipe for Soviet
repression which is discernable in the Baltic case.
"The events in the Baltic have followed the classic
pattern of Soviet communist methods: a barrage of lies and
disinformation about threats to the safety of lives and
the breakdown of order, the emergence of anonymous
"Committees of National Salvation" which have "taken
power", and whose instructions and requests are then
carried out by the armed forces.
"
[Ref . 76]
Given this Soviet use of the same methods that were
earlier used to subdue Eastern Europe, East European
18
nervousness is understandable. At face value this use of the
old thinking would seem to undercut East European independence
and stability.
B. ANALYSIS
1. Where Stands Gorbachev?
"Soviet Analyst" concludes from all of this that,
"There is no way back to the centre-ground for [Gorbachev] -
there is no longer any centre-ground. There is also no longer
a "Gorbachev reform programme", to which many Western leaders,
notably in Germany and Italy, continue to cling, despite all
evidence to the contrary.
"
[Ref. 77] The first
sentence is probably true but needs some qualification.
Gorbachev did not leave the centre-ground, so much as he stuck
to his position on the union. "Mr. Gorbachev, even in days
when his prestige was higher, has always backed the concept of
the current centralized union and insisted the
constitutionally guaranteed independence for the constituent
parts was an unthinkable option, even for the Baltic republics
that were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in
1940. "[Ref. 78]
Gorbachev seems to have been remarkably consistent. "When
we look at Mr. Gorbachev in the context of [his] beliefs, ["He
has never expressed less than total conviction that a future
Soviet Union will be socialist and controlled by the
apparat."] his policies take on new coherence. " [Ref . 79] In
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a televised address politicking for the union referendum, he
continued to stick to his position: "All my convictions are
based on the preservation of the union". [Ref. 80]
Gorbachev's spectrum of acceptable possibilities does not
include the implications of the Shatalin plan any more than it
includes the independence of the union ' s constituent
republics. The editor of Moscow News, Yegor Yakovlev, regrets
Gorbachev's inability to go further down the path of
democratization [Ref. 81]. "Describing the current
political landscape, some journalists [Soviet Analyst?] say
that Yeltsin, Popov and Sobchak are now in the centre while
Gorbachev has moved to the right. In actual fact, the




One change in the political yardstick is the disarray on
the left. "Radical leaders also say the political left is in
total disarray and is in no position to resist the drift
toward authoritarian rule. They add that democratic
institutions are still fragile and could easily
crumble. " [Ref . 83] Richard Pipes sums up the situation on the
left very nicely.
"...unfortunately, democratic forces are divided and
poorly organized. They consist of splinter parties
gathered around powerful personalities. Attempts to form
larger groupings have failed from lack of effective
leadership and the fear that enforcing party discipline
will lead to Bolshevik-type regimentation. Democratic
politicians have gained control of municipal government in
about fifty cities, but they face too many urgent problems





This is not to say that the left is devoid of power.
"Democratic Russia, for example, is extremely
disorganized. . .yet this movement. . .is able to call huge street
demonstrations at a moments notice.
"
[Ref. 85] But the
capability to mount demonstrations is entirely different than
the power to govern effectively, come to decisions quickly,
and implement them effectively. "Even some democratic leftists
criticize their own movement for failing to unify itself.
Indeed, leaders such as Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov and
Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak rail against the endless
parliamentary debates that stymie their governments." We
criticize Gorbachev for his wariness vis-a-vis the radical
democratic wing of perestroika, " commentator Len Karpinsky
observed in the liberal weekly Moscow News. "But sometimes I
can visualize the man taking stock of the democratic forces
which he himself brought into being and which he can now rely
on. And I don't think that there are many of
them. "[Ref. 86] Notwithstanding Gorbachev's
differences of opinion with the radical democrats, as regards
the desirability of the Shatalin plan or the breakup of the
union, they could not be relied upon to provide him with a
sound political foundation. The fight between the old
bureaucracies and the new reformists that are in power was not
going well for the reformists. Popov and Sobchak are having
problems running their respective cities because of the well-
entrenched antagonistic municipal bureaucracies, Gorbachev
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could not possibly run the union or a federation on the
unstable back of like constituencies.
A New York Times reporter described the problems that the
Soviets have with implementing reform.
"The Soviet body politic has been neither decisive or
consistent in articulating and putting into effect plans
to revive an economy that is sick unto death. Many Soviet
voters understand the debating aspect of democracy, but
not how to proceed to the decision phase. As a result,
they have debated, debated, debated about moving to a
market economy but have not actually begun to, and stores
have become emptier and emptier and emptier."
The reform end of the political spectrum was not a viable
alternative for Gorbachev because of its weakness. In light of
the lack of an alternative to the conservatives, and keeping
in mind the consistency of Gorbachev's views on the union, the
'turn to the right' is not as sinister as it might at first
seem. It is not a repudiation of all that has gone before.
2. A Gorbachev Doctrine
The Gorbachev onion has not been peeled to reveal a
vintage 1956 Khrushchev, or 1968 Brezhnev. While the Soviet
republics are a different matter, he does not seem to covet
Eastern Europe. There does seem to be a distinct difference in
his mind between the republics and Eastern Europe.
"Jettisoning Eastern Europe was not a foreshadowing of what
was to happen in the Soviet Union but rather a means of
preserving the Soviet Union and its socialist form of society.
Letting the Eastern European countries go was different from
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allowing any of the states in the original union to
secede.
"
[Ref. 87] So, while the language of repression in the
Baltics evokes 1956, 1968, and 1979, Gorbachev need not be
feared as a proponent of Soviet military control over Eastern
Europe. He is a proponent of Soviet control over Soviet
territory. In this light he should not be viewed as having
changed, or as being an insurmountable obstacle to East
European independence.
A Gorbachev Doctrine has emerged but it does not go
beyond Soviet Borders [Ref. 88]. The Baltic crackdown
"is consistent with at least five other bloody incidents that
have soiled Mr. Gorbachev's rule: in Kazakhstan in December
1986, in Georgia in April 1989, in Kokand, Uzbekistan, in
August 1989, in Azerbaijan in January 1990, and in
Tadzhikistan in February 1990. "[Ref. 89] Yes, the
Baltics are closer to the East European countries in question,
and to the West, than these other republics. Yet one cannot
escape the feeling that the West's response to the Baltic
repression was greater, than over the crackdowns in the other
republics, because of eurocentrism or ethnocentrism. In most
of the other cases of the use of force, it was muslims, non-
europeans, that were repressed. Events in the Baltics were in
fact not much more dramatic than some of these other
incidents, such as the use of gas in Georgia
[Ref. 90] . The Baltic repression has to be put into
perspective. It would be a mistake to interpret it as much
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more dangerous to European security than the use of force in
Uzbekistan.
This rings true especially when considering the manner in
which the 'crackdown' was conducted. Gorbachev would have
gotten very poor marks from Krushchev or Brezhnev as regards
the attack in the Baltics. The fact that the Kaunas broadcast
facilities were permitted to continue objective reporting has
already been noted. Speaking of the differences between the
East European crackdowns and the Baltic measures a reporter
noted that:
"What is different today is that, so far at least, the
Soviet Army has not clapped the Lithuanian legislators in
jail, arrested President Vyautas Landsbergis, or cut off
international telephone and telecommunications links. They
are, for the moment, still free to denounce Mr. Gorbachev
and the Soviet Army's actions, and international news
organizations are still able to report what they see in
Vilnius to the world. "[Ref. 91]
There seems to be a consensus that, despite the horrible
deaths, the Baltic attacks were really not much of a
crackdown. Another observer stated that:
"On the pragmatic level, the Soviet military did not fully
carry out a coup in Lithuania, for it left the elected
Parliament still sitting in Vilnius and apparently more
popular than ever. If the present confusion of authority
continues there, the Kremlin may feel further threatened
by a growing popular suspicion that it has grown so inept
that it can no longer even impose martial
law. "[Ref. 92]
Speaking from Vilnius, the same observer wrote that: "The
hard-liner's formula, resorting to force to settle political
conflicts, has been clumsily and selectively applied and has
not returned them to power here. "[Ref. 93] Speaking
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of the attacks in the Baltics, George Kennan criticized the
perspective that would link them to repression in Eastern
Europe. "They have not, contrary to the lurid exaggerations
that have appeared here and there in the Western press,
constituted a serious "crackdown" on the countries in
question, comparable to what took place in Hungary in 1956 or
in Czechoslovakia in 1968. "[Ref. 94]
While down-playing the danger from the repressive measures
in the Baltics, Mr. Kennan is concerned by conclusions he draws
from the fact that they were not effectively implemented. "The
principal significance of these recent episodes has lain
rather in the revelation they offer of a state of truly
alarming incoherence and lack of coordination in Moscow
itself, leading the other Western governments to ask
themselves whether any sort of serious and effective central
authority exists at all in that city." [Ref. 95]
Kennan is not alone in this concern. A sub-title to a recent
article read, "Did Soviet Leader Botch Crackdown?"
.
[Ref . 96]
This questioning of Moscow's grip on events derives from the
simple question: Who ordered the crackdown? This question was
posed in L' Express. "Crucial question: either the Soviet
president ordered the massacre, and perestroika is
definitively dead; or he has been outmaneuvered by his
military, which indicates that he no longer governs anything.
"I was not informed", explained Gorbachev, echoing the
responsible ministers, Boris Pugo (Interior) and Dmitri Yazov
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(Defense) . In fact, numerous indications lead one to believe
that the head of the Soviet Union is only barely in control of
the reinstitution of order in the baltic republics."
[Translated by this writer.] [Ref. 97] By saying
that either Gorbachev ordered the crackdown or that he is no
longer in charge, the writers oversimplify but do manage to
get at the heart of the concern over control of the military.
The waffling of the Kremlin over who is responsible for
the repression, actually the issue they are unwilling to pin
down is who is responsible for the deaths, is causing concern
over a lack of authority.
"Today, Mr. Gorbachev said he learned of the deadly
assault after the fact and he contended the Lithuanians
themselves were to blame in bringing down the army on
their heads. His ministers attempted to spare him personal
blame, contending that there was no direct order from the
Kremlin for the attack. They talked as if the central
Government's army has somehow come under control of a
hurriedly cobbled Communist front group in Lithuania that




Gorbachev did change his tone regarding the civilian deaths
and express some regret [Ref. 99]. He also promised
an investigation into culpability for the deaths
[Ref. 100]. At the international level the Foreign
Ministry promised the withdrawal of extra troops from the
Baltics, [supposedly complete by 30 January 1991 [Ref. 101]],
and a return to dialogue and away from violence
[Ref. 102]. Gorbachev is backing away from what happened in
the Baltics, at the same time that he does not seem to be
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entirely displeased with the idea that events may have subdued
their independence drive.
3. The Military & The Baltics
The decoupling of the civilian leadership in Moscow and
military units in the Baltics seems unexplainable until one
considers the role the military has played. There has been
evidence of long-term military disaffection with events in the
Baltics. The Soviet military press , including "Soviet Military
Review" and "Soviet Soldier", has been highly critical of
Baltic agitation for greater autonomy [Ref. 103].
The danger to purely military interests posed by such
agitation is underlined [Ref. 104]. The Soviet
military still seems to be indoctrinating its personnel with
the story that the Red Army acted in a legal and protective
role in taking over the Baltic states. [Ref. 105] The
military was working to set its personnel against Baltic
aspirations for some time. Military propaganda seems to be
responding to what the military sees as threats, overt
opposition to the military, and the indirect threat to the
military of breakup of the union. Marshal Akhromeyev himself
said that the army "was going to defend the Constitution and
the unity of the state. "[Ref. 106]
Marshal Yazov's announcement of the Gorbachev approved
extension of military powers was at least in part, probably a
large part, targeted against the Baltics. The new measures
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authorized the seizure of power, water and food installations
if local authorities cut them off, as some threatened they
would do [Ref . 107] . These and related measures
were designed to reinforce the military in its disputes with
belligerent republics.
"Gorbachev earlier took steps to appease the Army by
issuing a decree voiding any legislation passed by the
republics concerning the military. The decree was
apparently aimed at the Baltics, where Latvia approved a
law last month cutting off supplies to military bases in
the republic. Other republics, such as the Ukraine and
Russia, which have shown a desire to form their own
armies, will also be banned from doing so. Dissatisfaction
with Gorbachev's policies had been mounting in the
military. Particularly bothersome for the establishment
was the fact that thousands of youths in the republics
failed to report after being drafted.
"
[Ref . 108]
As part of this empowering of the military so that it
could get what it needed, it was able to send 1,000
paratroopers to Vilnius as early as 11 January 1991, to
capture draft evaders [Ref. 109]. The president
himself seemed to champion the military and warn Lithuania of
its power. "Gorbachev called on Lithuania today to halt its
defiance of Soviet authority immediately, and warned that
"people are demanding" the introduction of direct Kremlin rule
of the breakaway republic.
"
[Ref . 110] After the
attacks occurred, Gorbachev, Yazov and Pugo all included, in
their justifications for the measure, the "persecution of
Soviet soldiers and sailors and their families in
Lithuania"
.
[Ref . Ill] The military had its own
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organizational reasons for the repression and seems to have
managed to get a temporary ally out of Gorbachev.
The results of the attacks in the Baltics are very
revealing. In Lithuania, the parliament suspended legislation
that restricted food and services for the local Soviet Army
garrisons [Ref. 112]. In Latvia, the parliament
acquiesced to military demands that roadblocks be
lifted, [Ref. 113] and adopted a much more
conciliatory stance [Ref. 114]. In Estonia,
republic and military leaders came to an agreement on
conscription in the republic [Ref. 115]. Reporters
in Vilnius were told by a Defense Ministry representative,
Major General Yuri I. Nauman, that, regarding rumors of an
attack on the Lithuanian parliament building, "Such an action
will not be taken. . .the military do not need
it. "[Ref. 116] The clear implication is that the
military acted separately, that it needed to do something,
that this did not include attacking the parliament, but that
in any case it was solely a military decision as to whether or
not to do so. In other words, the military got all that it
needed out of the acts of intimidation that it conducted.
Supplies to its garrisons were protected, the conscription
problem was being worked on in a more constructive way, with
the local governments participating in talks and not
obstructing any dialogue, and some respect for the military
position was injected into the parliaments. The local Baltic
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obstructing any dialogue, and some respect for the military
position was injected into the parliaments. The local Baltic
military measures were decoupled from the center at Moscow.
Gorbachev had already enabled them, through his decrees, to
protect themselves and their interests vis-a-vis the
republics, as they saw fit.
4. Political Maneuvering
Michael Dobbs from the Washington Post seems to have
gotten a solid grasp around the reasons for the 'half-
crackdown
.
"According to the semi-official version of events,
Gorbachev came under mounting pressure from hardliners at
the end of last year to reimpose strong central authority.
The disarray among pro-democracy forces meant that it was
very difficult for him to resist demands by hard-liners in
the Communist Party and army for a crackdown. So he gave
these forces—known here as "conservatives"—a free hand
to "reimpose order" in Lithuania, the republic that had
gone further than any other in rejecting the Soviet
constitution. This portrayal of Gorbachev still struggling
with the hardliners even as he climbs into bed with them
is partly self-serving, designed to reassure the West that
the president remains a "good guy" at heart. But it is
consistent with Gorbachev's long-standing political
stratagem of staking out the middle ground by maintaining
a constant balance between opposing political forces. The
available evidence suggests that Gorbachev never intended
last month's abortive coup in Lithuania to develop into a
full-scale military crackdown. Indeed, he may have been
banking on a sharp domestic and Western reaction as a way
of reining in the hard-liners.
"
[Ref. 117]
Gorbachev's follow-up to the crackdown: including the
aforementioned regret over the casualties, the already noted,
announced withdrawal of troops involved in the measures, and
also the sending of an emissary to facilitate
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normalization, [Ref . 118] lend credence to the idea that he is
distancing himself from the military repression. The emissary,
"Georgii S. Tarazevich, chairman of the committee on
Nationalities and Inter-ethnic Conflicts of the Soviet
Parliament, told legislators, "My mission is to give help to
the legal government of Lithuania, the Parliament of
Lithuania, to return to normal life, to find a way to
constructive cooperation among all factions.
"
[Ref . 119] This
tone belies the harsh pre-crackdown voice of the central
government. Whether Gorbachev is using the crackdown to
control the hardliners is impossible to say from this
distance, but there is definitely a change in tack from
confrontation to conciliation. The conservative tactics may
have been discredited, or the army might have gotten, as noted
from Major General Nauman's comment, what it wanted.
In discussing the targeting of broadcast facilities for
attack in the Baltics, it was noted that foreign reporting was
permitted, with the Foreign Ministry being very liberal, one
might even think, supportive of it [Ref. 120]. Their
presence and their reporting was certainly not welcomed by the
military who were compelled to come up with some extravagant
lies to dismiss, for example, the charges of tanks running
over civilians. "Asked about photographs and witnesses'
accounts of tanks running over unarmed civilians, the general
[Nauman]
,
quoted one paratrooper as claiming: "One civilian
put his leg under the right tread of my tank, and they
31
photographed him." [Ref. 121] The photograph that the
good general referred to is probably that which appeared on
the front page of the 14 January 1991 New York Times. It
certainly could have been staged but Western reports clearly
state that civilians had been killed by Soviet tanks
[Ref. 122]. The general's statements did not respond
in any way to the deaths that did occur. Western reporting
could, from the point of view of Soviet conservatives, almost
certainly have been dispensed with. In permitting Western
media coverage of the Baltic repression the Foreign Ministry
was obviously not acting in the way one would expect if
Gorbachev had been captured by the conservatives.
Like the repression in the Baltics, Eduard Shevardnadze's
resignation seemed a dramatic flag, indicating Gorbachev's
right turn. While Bessmertnykh may not be as simpatico to the
West as his predecessor, care has been taken to insist that
his instatement is not evidence of a chill in Soviet foreign
policy. Gorbachev, in a 16 January speech at the Foreign
Ministry, affirmed the continuity of the Soviet Foreign Policy
which had started in 1985 [Ref. 123]. It appears
that Mr. Bessmertnykh was picked with an eye to continuing his
predecessors policies [Ref. 124]. During the
nomination process at the Supreme Soviet Bessmertnykh, "in his
speech and answers to many questions openly and boldly
defended our foreign policy" [Ref. 125] Shevardnadze
himself described Bessmertnykh as a colleague in the
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application of new thinking, of the ongoing Soviet foreign
policy line [Ref . 126] . Bessmertnykh does owe his
new prominence to Gorbachev and new thinking
[Ref. 127] but it must be remembered that he served
Brezhnev for far longer. He is a bureaucrat weaned on old
style Soviet policies, this might make him somewhat more
palatable to the hardliners than Shevardnadze was [Ref. 128].
While writing of other personnel shifts, one writer noted a
difference with regard to the Foreign Ministry. "Only
Shevardnadze's replacement, Alexander Bessmertnykh, represents
any degree of reformist thinking, but his appointment appears
to be Gorbachev's singular attempt to maintain some connection
with the West. The Foreign Ministry seems to stand in limbo,
an isolated bastion of political moderates in an increasingly
hard-line regime.
"
[Ref . 129] An illustration of this
is the attributed "common view at the Soviet Defense Ministry,
where complaints about the Foreign Ministry's "softness" are
frequently heard. "[Ref. 130]
Gorbachev's tendency to go from left to right, his ability
to form tactical alliances, to survive politically, is notable
[Ref. 131]
"Traditionally, Gorbachev and his entourage are described
as the Centre. They really do try to manoeuvre between the
left and the right. But how possible is such manoeuvreing
in a country with no centrist movement? Such a movement
cannot emerge without a middle class and the elementary
traditions of political compromise. That is why our
leaders have to lean on the left today and on the right
tomorrow, gravitating towards the
latter. "[Ref. 132]
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Because the left proved itself to be unstable up to the 'Turn
to the Right" [Ref. 133], and because the
nationalist republican leadership - Yeltsin for example - was
unpalatable, Gorbachev did his manoeuvering between
bureaucratic constituencies and not, as the above writer
assumes, between the left and right on a traditional political
spectrum. The political spectrum was not a reflection of the
power spectrum. The left had little to no power. The power
spectrum is shared by the bureaucracies, those of the center
no less than those of the republics. The situation is aptly
summed up by the title of an article in Jane's Soviet
Intelligence Review: "1990 - The Balkanization of Soviet
Power." The Soviet situation is described in the article's
first few sentences.
"One can no longer talk of a Soviet state, less yet of a
reform programme. The past year has seen the Party's
carefully developed and husbanded monopoly of power
shatter as new bodies, groups
,
leaders, and
constituencies vie to ensure their aspirations and
ideologies are represented in the post-Communist
order. "[Ref. 134]
By giving the military free reign in the Baltics, enabling
them to protect their own threatened institutional interests,
Gorbachev moved towards the goal he holds in common with the
military, the preservation of the union. At the same time the
Foreign Ministry was allowed to permit media coverage of the
events, undercutting any increase in military power. The two
organizations, with their antagonistic programmes, seem to be
held in check by each other, with Gorbachev's role insured as
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an arbiter. The most skillful organizational player, however,
seems to be the KGB.
"The KGB has been equally skillful at cleaning up its
present [as it was with its past] , minimizing any public
association with the violent crackdown by the Soviet
military in the Baltics and with trouble in other ethnic
hot spots. After 15 people were killed in Vilnius in
January, Interior Minister Boris Pugo and Defense Minister
Dmitri Yazov were called on the carpet and grilled about
the killings by an angry Supreme Soviet in Moscow. While
the two squirmed at the podium, Kryuchkov sat quietly at
his place, marking work papers from pink and red folders,
looking up occasionally to follow the debate and see who
was speaking. Mention in the Soviet press of KGB
participation in the crackdown came only after it became
known that among those killed in Vilnius was a Lieutenant,
Victor Shatsikh, from a KGB spetnatz (special forces)
unit. In February, not a single deputy asked Kryuchkov a




This organization was a strong impetus for perestroika; and
while it certainly objects to some of Gorbachev's reforms,
namely the discarding of the vanguard role for the Party,
because of its strong Party sympathies; it may have much else
that is in common with Gorbachev's efforts to reform the
empire [Ref. 136]
.
Citing the placement of small detachments of airborne
troops in the Baltic, Transcaucasia, and Western Ukraine,
ostensibly to round up draft evaders, one analyst interpreted
this move as Gorbachev upping the stakes in the struggle
between the central authorities and republican governments
[Ref. 137]. The military attacks in the Baltics were
certainly an escalatory move on the part of these same
authorities. The other rambunctious republics certainly must
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be reconsidering their positions in the light of the Baltic
events. Georgia in particular seems to consider itself next on
the list for repression. Zviad K.Gamsakhurdia, the leader of
the pro-separatist Georgian Parliament, said, "If they get the
Baltics, they'll come and get us. . .Apparently, it's the
military who are deciding things." [Ref. 138]
Interior Minister Pugo had assured Gamsakhurdia that the army
would not intervene in Georgia, the latter attributed this to
the high likelihood of heavy fighting should the army make a
move in the republic [Ref. 139]. "The Army isn't
doing a thing to stop the fighting," said Arkady Shivkaev, a
South Ossetian militia member. "After Lithuania, they are
afraid to get involved. " [Ref . 140] The army may
indeed have gotten its hand slapped because of Lithuania.
Gorbachev might have used events there to better control it.
This reluctance to get involved might also be because the army
is not being threatened as severely in Georgia as it was by
measures to cut off local garrisons from supplies which were
taken by the Baltic republican governments.
Nevertheless, Moscow does seem to be using similar tactics
in Georgia (and elsewhere) , creating an atmosphere of chaos,
as it did in the Baltics. The Georgians accuse Moscow of
fomenting violence among the Ossetians in the republic
[Ref. 141]. Disclosures of KGB activities reveal a
modus operandi of inciting ethnic violence and chaos in order
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to prepare the way for a turn away from reform and towards
order-restoring authoritarianism [Ref. 142]. A New
York Times editorial stated that, "food shortages are being
manipulated to create the impression of
chaos". [Ref. 143] Disruption plays into the hands
of the conservatives. "The latter bide their time: the greater
the disorder and the more disastrous the state of the economy,
the better their chances of regaining
power. "[Ref. 144] Richard Pipes cites " polls
[which] suggest that the prospects for political and economic
democracy in the USSR are not at all promising, and that the
conservatives have a bigger potential constituency than
appears at first sight. Behind the facade of complete
renovation, old attitudes survive, as do the forces that hope
to profit from them. "[Ref. 145] He says that,
"people are disenchanted with democracy, perhaps because they
had no inkling how much more difficult it is to institute than
dictatorship. " [Ref . 146] Against this one has to
weigh the resiliency of nationalism. At present the scales are
tipped in favor of the forces of centralism. However, many,
including Richard Pipes [Ref. 147], and George
Kennan [Ref. 148], seem to think that the
nationalists will and should win out in the end.
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C. ASSESSMENT
Given Gorbachev's sea change, from running against the
nomenklatura to running with it, what is one to make of it? Is
it a hard 180 degree turn? Or is it a tack? That is, is he
going back the way he came? Or has he changed course while
retaining his ultimate goal? As one can see the record of the
•turn to the right' is extremely ambivalent. The 'crackdown'
was not as extreme a reverse as it at first seemed. The
Foreign Ministry remains in the hands of a reformist. If
Gorbachev is replaced, Mr. Bessmertnykh seems perfectly
capable of adjusting to more conservative masters. The
military has had its discretionary powers greatly expanded,
but seems (like the Interior Ministry) to have been burned in
the Baltics. The KGB remains untouched by those events and
probably has a hand in stirring up problems in the republics.
This mixed bag of trends does not indicate a 180 degree course
change. Gorbachev does indeed seem to have formed a tactical
alliance with the conservatives. He, like they, wants to
preserve the union. Gorbachev ran into some headwinds, the
nationalist-republican resistance, such that he could not make
headway. He had to tack. He had to change direction. That has
meant turning away somewhat from his goal but this does not
mean that, in his own mind, he is not heading towards it. A
sailboat sailing into the wind cannot go directly towards its
objective. It has to turn back and forth until it finally
achieves its destination. Gorbachev is the same.
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Speaking to this, "President Mikhail S. Gorbachev declared
today [22 Jan. 91] that the confrontation in the Baltic states
did not mark any change in his policies, and he rejected
accusations that he had abandoned his reformist course. .. "The
events of recent days were used by certain circles to
aggravate the situation under the pretext of a purported turn
to the right and the danger of dictatorship," Mr. Gorbachev
said. "I resolutely rebuff these allegations. The achievements
of perestroika, democratization and glasnost were and remain
eternal values, which presidential power will
protect.
"
[Ref. 149] The goal, perestroika, remains the same.
Speaking of Gorbachev's accumulation of power, a presidential
aide Georgy Shakhnazarov said, "Without this, it is impossible
to stabilize the situation or reform the economy ... The
president is strengthening his powers only in order to protect
democracy and perestroika [restructuring], the cause of his
whole life. "[Ref. 150]
Keeping in mind the fragility of the reformist left on the
Soviet political spectrum, even some reformist personalities
are in accordance with the need for authoritarian measures.
"Others, including many liberal intellectuals, endorse the
view that democratic institutions are too weak to protect
the process of reform at this moment. .. Liberal historian
Nodari Simonia compares the Soviet Union to countries such
as South Korea or Spain, which used strongman rule to
modernize and gradually democratize. "In transitional
periods, you need authoritarian regimes to carry out the
process of democratization, " he contends. Vladimir
Sokolov, writing in a recent issue of the liberal weekly
Literaturnaya Gazeta, argues that a combination of
military and presidential power are needed to put market
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reforms into effect. He compares this to the role of the
United States military occupation of Japan and West
Germany after World War II." [Ref. 151]
Igor Kliamkin and Andranik Migranian hold, and have
publicly expressed, similar views [Ref. 152]. These
independent writers all seem to agree that a turn to
authoritarianism is not necessarily a bad thing. It does not
necessitate a rejection of perestroika. Gorbachev may not be
doing things inside the USSR that meet Western approval, but
if he is able, following his tack to the right, will come a
tack to the left.
Despite Gorbachev's domestic maneuvering, he is still the
leader that enabled Eastern Europe to go its own way. This
discussion should provide the basis for an understanding that
recent Soviet domestic events do not necessarily preclude
international accord. Gorbachev does not have to be an
obstacle to East European independence. European stability is
not precluded by recent events, once one gets beyond the
alarmist reaction that naturally occurs when Soviet tanks are
on the move.
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III. THE SOVIET MILITARY
This chapter, on the increase in the Soviet military voice
in internal and external affairs, is in effect a subset of the
first chapter on the turn to the right. Whether the apparent
increase in military power is cause for the turn to the right,
or whether the reverse is true is impossible to say and really
a moot point. What can be noted is the relative congruence in
time between the two events. The military had been suffering
from a tremendous decrease in prestige. Glasnost seems to have
opened the floodgates of criticism over issues of hazing, the
Afghanistan debacle, ethnic problems, the costs of defense,
military reform, and the military role in quelling internal
unrest [Ref. 153]. Along with these internal events,
external events have also been threatening. The breakup of the
Warsaw Pact [Ref. 154], and the renunciation of the
Brezhnev Doctrine and the loss of Eastern Europe have been
hard blows [Ref. 155] . The criticism and the changes
to the European status quo have led to what has been described
as a "'besieged fortress' psychology now prevailing in
garrisons scattered all over the country [which] is
exceptionally dangerous today." This "makes the military ask
for extreme rights.
"
[Ref . 156] These demands for
extreme rights have apparently been granted to some extent, as
noted previously in the granting of extraordinary powers to
the military, and the free reign given them in the Baltics.
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One question needs to be addressed before proceeding; why
the close perusal of the military and not the KGB? The KGB, as
noted, has gained in power and has seemingly maintained a
better profile throughout the repression process. The focus is
on the military because it was largely through that instrument
that Soviet hegemony was maintained in Eastern Europe. The
demise of the East European regimes can be dated from the time
that it was made known that the USSR, under Gorbachev, would
not militarily support them. The bottom line for Soviet
influence in Europe, and especially Eastern Europe was, and
will be, their military threat. It is in this light that the
Soviet high command's relative power in the USSR, and its
worldview are critical. In the domestic Soviet arena the
relationship between the generals and Gorbachev, who despite
internal conservatism seems to retain his "new thinking", has
repercussions for Europe. In the Foreign Policy arena, given
the senior military officers' greater voice, their point of
view becomes correspondingly more important. The first section
of this chapter discusses pertinent issues of internal civil-
military relationships in the USSR. The second section
discusses the military elite's agitation in the foreign policy
arena. The third addresses aspects of the military worldview
of importance to Eastern Europe. The goal is to come to some
understanding of the impact that a seemingly greater military
voice has on Soviet-Western relations.
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A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The KGB - early-Gorbachev alliance in starting perestroika
has already been mentioned. The military and the early-
Gorbachev seem to have shared a similar relationship for much
the same reasons. "The high command supported Mr. Gorbachev's
restructuring agenda precisely because it responded to the
military's long-standing concerns. Perestroika promised to
deliver what the military needed: a modern economy, capable of
producing the requisite quantity and quality of high-tech
weaponry, and a healthy society, able to produce educated,
fit, and motivated citizens to man the new weapons.
Concurrently, Gorbachev's global initiatives were to stabilize
the international environment, grant the USSR access to
Western technology, and constrain the United States from
racing ahead to field its technological edge. In short,
perestroika promised to give the Soviet armed forces a most




The military seemed to have asked, 'What is to be done?'
back in the early 1980 's. Their answer seems to have run
parallel to the conclusion that Gorbachev came up with a few
years later.
"Five years before Gorbachev made perestroika a household
word, Marshall of the Soviet Union Nikolay V. Ogarkov
appealed for 'perestroika' of the Soviet Armed Forces and,
in support of their mobilization and warfighting
readiness, for restructuring of 'the entire economy, [as
well as] political, societal, scientific, and other
institutions'. While the similarity in terminology is
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interesting in itself, the conceptual consistency between
Ogarkov's 1982 blueprint and Gorbachev's much more
comprehensive model is compelling. What is perhaps most
striking about Ogarkov's agenda for change is the urgency
and cogency of his argument, reflecting the conviction
that the USSR simply has no other alternative but to
reform - or else fall hopelessly behind. It is that same
urgency - driven by similar convictions - which resonates




Marshal Akhromeyev seems to have pursued Ogarkov's line of
reasoning, although probably more circumspectly than his
predecessor. Ogarkov's role seems to be minimal but the two of
them are purportedly advisors to Gorbachev
[Ref. 159]. Defense Minister Yazov and Chief of the
General Staff Moiseyev are both said to be adherents of
Ogarkov's ideas [Ref. 160]. The basic congruence
between the military reformers and Gorbachev, their continued
presence at his side, and their common point of view with
regard to internal policies; all point towards continued
military influence with Gorbachev. And this despite
divergences over past foreign policy moves which have
seemingly been laid at Shevardnadze's door.
It is not only in foreign policy that there has been
divergence between Gorbachev and the highest military
officers. In general terms what seems to have occurred is a
fracture between the military and the civilian leadership
along the military-technical and socio-political dividing line
of Soviet military doctrine. Gorbachev's and Ogarkov's visions
of a renewed and strengthened socio-political base upon which
44
to build a solid military-technical future were remarkably
consonant.
"Basic agreement seems to exist among the Soviet political
and military leadership on the broad aspects of the
social-political component of doctrine. . . However,
general agreement on terms and broad concepts does not
necessarily equate to commonality of meaning and
application in practice. In December 1987, Marshall
Akhromeev, former Chief of the General Staff, indicated
that while there was agreement on the political aspects of
the new doctrine, the military-technical aspects pose
'complex and fundamental questions, the correct answer to




It is in the military-technical branch of Soviet doctrine that
differences emerge. The military elite see it as their
bailiwick and they resent the meddling of
others, [Ref. 162] especially the institutchiki
TRef. 1631 and the Foreign Ministry. It is in the
implications that one draws from perestroika that differences
emerge between the civilian and the military reformers. While
agreeing in their overall assessments as to force reductions
in 1988 "the General Staff and the political leadership held
divergent opinions when it came to actually executing the
force cuts. "[Ref. 164] Gorbachev's reliance on
political guarantees vice military strength for security has
not been fully swallowed by the high command
[Ref. 165]. It continues to emphasize the
modernization and development of its forces as the guarantor
of Soviet security [Ref. 166]. Reasonable
Sufficiency and Defensive Defense do not seem to mean the same
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thing to the military elite and the civilian reformers
[Ref. 167]. "A recent article in the Soviet defense
newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda questioned the wisdom of Soviet
military doctrine that concentrates primarily on defensive
actions ." [Ref . 168] These differences seem to
continue to the present.
However recently, probably as a result of Gorbachev's need
for the military in holding the union together, he has been
more supportive and less critical of the armed forces. William
Odom noted this change.
"Gorbachev has begun to back-pedal on making the military
put up with public abuse. For example, he recently stated
in a talk to Komsomol congress delegates that a volunteer
army is precluded for the present because of the large
costs it would entail. After the army met public
resistance to call-ups for units used in repressing the
Popular Front in Azerbaijan in January 1990, his language
toward the military has become more conciliatory (and he
even promoted Yazov to Marshal of the Soviet Union on May
Day 1990) ."[Ref. 169]
Gorbachev's self-criticism made during his 12 December 1990
speech, "Perestroika is Marked by Pitfalls"
[Ref. 170], to the Congress of People's Deputies, is
further evidence of back-pedaling. "We underestimated the
depth of our society's crisis. Insufficiently grounded and
hasty decisions were taken during the implementation of our
economic and political reforms. The emerging dangers were not
always correctly and promptly addressed. We were not
sufficiently resolute in our efforts to prevent them from
turning into negative phenomena.
"
[Ref . 171] Gorbachev seemed
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to be trying to defuse criticism, much of it from the military
"By the time of the Twenty-eighth Party congress in
July. . .attacks by military leaders on Gorbachev's security
policies had assumed a virulence unprecedented in Soviet
history.
"
[Ref. 172], at the same time as he soothed military
sensibilities.
"There is also the question of our armed forces. They are
responsible for the defence of our state. The Army is an
important bulwark of the country ' s state sovereignty and
its internal and external stability. It is now living
through a period of in-depth reforms and requires utmost
attention and care. I believe that it is essential from
this platform to resolutely denounce any mud-slinging anddiscrimination against our armed
forces. "[Ref. 173]
It seems unlikely that Gorbachev will be successful in
wooing the high military echelons to himself once more. He had
their support early in the perestroika program only to lose it
as the implications for the military of the road Gorbachev was
travelling became clear. "Officers who appeared sympathetic to
his broad objectives at an earlier stage in the reform process
have watched in dismay as he has embraced progressively more
radical initiatives, some of which run counter to the
intrinsic interests of the military establishment.
"
[Ref . 174]
The high command is unlikely to trust Gorbachev again. At the
moment they seem to recognize a congruence of interest with
him in maintaining the integrity of the union. At some
possible future date, if the union survives, they are likely
to regard continued cooperation with Gorbachev as contrary to
47
their interests. Both sides are fellow travellers now, but in
those moments when immediate events do not fill their field of
view, they all must see an eventual fork in the road they are
following. With a secured union, Gorbachev would probably
continue with his interrupted plans of perestroika and new
thinking. The military elite must look to a less radical
future of gradual reform.
As noted earlier the two sides started off together with
remarkably similar conceptions of what needed to be done.
During the course of events they separated. The military was
understandably threatened by some of Gorbachev's initiatives.
Now they are cooperating again under the rubric of preserving
the union. Yet, as has been intimated, this new arrangement is
qualitatively different. From the military point of view,
Gorbachev created the rupture by going too far in his program.
Stephen Foye has written about the civil-military arrangements
under previous Soviet leaders, and the effects of Gorbachev's
changes upon it.
"Despite tensions during the Khrushchev years, civil-
military relations in the postwar period seem to have been
relatively harmonious. This probably had less to do with
the Party's methods of control than with its willing
embrace of a militarized economy and a confrontational
foreign policy. Particularly under Brezhnev, a "social
contract" appears to have been fashioned on the basis of
this Marxist-Leninist world view, benefiting the defense
community and several other elite groups, including the
Communist Party apparatus itself. Gorbachev's perestroika
program abrogated that "social
contract"". [Ref. 175]
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Perestroika seemed to promise the military, faced as they
were with an apparently undesirable future, with the
possibility of a renewed social contract once the country
restructured itself. However the pitfalls of perestroika that
Gorbachev mentioned in his speech [Ref. 176], were
threatening to the military elite. With the old civil-military
arrangement broken, and the consensus over perestroika lost,
the military is becoming more of an independent actor. There
is a present tie to Gorbachev in an alliance to save the
union, but this is tactical. There seems to be a time limit to
it. It will expire once the union's future is assured. The
long-standing and stable civil-military ties of the past are
gone. The generals have been burned once by trusting
Gorbachev's reforms. It will probably play a role increasingly
defined by what it sees as its • institutional interests and
the interests of the state as it sees them.
With Gorbachev siding with the military on the issue of
its prestige, and calling for support for it during this
period of military reform, it seems highly likely that the
military will get its way in deciding on the direction of
those reforms. The much commented upon debate over defense
policy [Ref. 177] seems to have been resolved in
favor of the military participants in that debate. As
mentioned earlier, Gorbachev has reined in Glasnost and made
it clear that criticism of the military is no longer
tolerable. As a result, the opinions of the so called
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institutchiki seem to matter much less now. Their adoption of
Robert McNamara • s criterion of 400 equivalent megatons (EMT)
as reasonable sufficiency to deter nuclear attack has
apparently gone by the wayside [Ref. 178]. The same
seems true for the idea of a military force capable only of
defensive combat actions [Ref. 179]. It is the
General Staff version of * reasonable sufficiency' (nuclear
parity not 400 EMT) and ^defensive defense' (not entirely
defensive) that seem to have won out against the more
favorable, to the West, civilian versions.
The Soviet military looks for parity in forces with the
West [Ref. 180] so further unilateral force
reductions are less likely. "In a long commentary on military
doctrine, published Monday [4 Mar. '91] in the Army daily Red
Star, the Soviet tank force chief, Marshal Oleg Losik,
attacked liberals who call for a smaller military and argued
the Soviet Union must maintain nothing less than absolute
parity with the West. "[Ref. 181] Reasonable
Sufficiency is not likely to be as comforting to the West in
reality as it sounds. Likewise defensive defense will probably
have more of a counteroffensive capability, given military
druthers [Ref. 182].
Speaking to several developments in the structural changes
undergone by the military under the frontispiece of
perestroika, one analyst came to unsettling conclusions. He
examined the effect of the removal of a tank regiment from
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Soviet tank divisions, the roughly 3 00 percent increase in
self-propelled artillery and 200 percent increase in infantry
fighting vehicles in Soviet MRDs, and the switch from
concentration of mass to concentration of firepower to achieve
breakthroughs [Ref. 183].
"In sum, the Soviets are in the process of restructuring
their forces into true combined arms formations, as
opposed to the tank and motor rifle divisions which they
had in the past. These formations are structured so as to
meet Soviet military doctrine, which the Soviets have
described as 'defensive' ever since the foundation of the
USSR over 70 years ago. In today's milieu, however, what
must be considered is the overall trend in the Soviet
military. Pronouncements by the Soviets that their units
are being restructured into strictly defensive forces
cannot be taken at face value considering the spectacular
increases in firepower and the Soviet use of massed fire
to achieve breakthroughs now being discussed by
authorities such as General Vorobyev.
"
[Ref . 184]
Soviet Military Power 1990 addressed this issue in discussing
the highly publicized defensive reorganization of Soviet
ground forces. "What has not been widely publicized is the
fact that the new structure is a well-balanced combat force
featuring a significant increase of artillery systems, armored




Soviet commentators have underlined the peaceful nature of
Soviet security policy since 1917 [Ref. 186]. The
terms 'Reasonable Sufficiency' and 'Defensive defensive'
should carry the same dubious connotations for Westerners that
peaceful coexistence once held. With the high command in the
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driver's seat of military reform the West should not feel
comfortable with these terms no matter how often they are
spouted
.
The military has regained control of the armed forces
reform process and has cleared the other parties to the
defense debate from the table. The loss of more moderate
voices in the discussion is an unhappy result for the
unhindered exercise of East European independence, and for
greater European security. There are other pernicious
influences upon resulting from the increased influence of the
military establishment in external affairs.
B. RENEGADE MILITARY FOREIGN POLICY
The most alarming development for prospects of
European security agreements is evidence that the Soviet
military is conducting it's own foreign policy. A most
striking example of this was the nuclear test conducted at
Novaya Zemlya. *New Times' expressed reservations about this
and about the Army's private agenda.
"Society needs a good, reliable Army. It wants to be sure
that military secrets do not disguise negligence. Society
wants to know whether current military doctrine
corresponds to the policy of the state and the president.
Can society be sure that the Army serves the state and is
controlled by the parliament, if neither local nor Russian
Republic authorities were informed in advance about the
recent nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya? It is hard to
believe that the Kremlin would have agreed to this nuclear
muscle flexing which damaged the prestige of this




The point was made earlier that military doctrine does not
and probably will not, given military influence, reflect what
was meant by reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense when
the terms were coined. The most recent Novaya Zemlya blast
seems to be evidence, like the inconsistencies in the Baltic
repression, of Defense and Foreign Ministry infighting. The
Ministry of Defense seems to have been trying to undercut
diplomatic disarmament initiatives. If the USSR had
abided by the spirit of the CFE agreement then it would have
had to submit to enormous arms cuts. These would have entailed
reductions of: 11,748 tanks, 5,125 artillery pieces, 12,320
armored combat vehicles, 3,040 aircraft, and 1,350 helicopters
[Ref. 188]. If they had come through and cut these
arms, then Western security assessments would have had to
include some measure of Soviet good faith. Such a drastic cut
would have demonstrated a massive Soviet investment in the
CSCE process and in integration into Europe and a foundation
for common security. CFE would have been the example par
excellence of the type of political solution to security
problems that the Soviet military finds so unacceptable. The
fact that the Soviet high command is looking after its own
narrow interests has been shown by public denouncements of the
CFE treaty by Soviet generals who view it as detrimental to
the Soviet military position in Europe [Ref. 189].
The military used the two year treaty negotiating period to
conduct an end run around its provisions.
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In the course of the negotiations the Soviet military
transferred "thousands of weapons East of the Urals into
Soviet Asia. Since the equipment was not in Europe when the
data exchange took place ...[18 November 1990]... the Soviets
are not bound by the treaty to destroy
it." [Ref. 190] John Mendelsohn, deputy director of
the Arms Control Association, has argued over the real
significance of these Soviet equipment transfers. "At the very
least, the Soviet equipment is out of the European theater, so
that any massing of forces for attack would involve a long
cumbersome undertaking. . .You do not drive tanks from beyond
the Urals to the front lines. "[Ref. 191] SACEUR,
General John Galvin, has a different point of view. While the
Soviets might need time to breakout of the CFE treaty using
troop movements from outside the ATTU area, General Galvin is
concerned with the reaction time of the western democracies to
initial Soviet measures. He stated that the West would have 3
days to prepare for an assault once Soviet troops moved West
of the Urals. [Ref. 192]
Soviet Military Power '90 estimated that about 7,000
Soviet tanks had been moved outside the CFE limitations area
[Ref. 193], There are about 300 tanks in a maneuver
division [tank or motorized rifle division {MRD}]
[Ref. 194], Theoretically the 7,000 tanks could be
formed into roughly 2 3 tank divisions or MRDs, a substantial
force. More recent information, reportedly from the director
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of the Defense Intelligence Agency, asserts that 10,000 tanks,
4,000 other armored vehicles, and 2 0,000 artillery pieces have
been shifted east of the Urals to avoid destruction under the
CFE agreement [Ref. 195]. General Galvin's worries
are understandable given the magnitude of the equipment
stockpiled.
The Soviets seem to be continuing to pull equipment from
the Atlantic to the Urals [ATTU] area [Ref. 196].
There is also some feeling in the Bush administration that the
Soviets are understating their force levels in the ATTU region
[Ref. 197]. "Western spokesmen say their
intelligence shows that the Soviet Union still has a number of
formations in place that its spokesmen said had been disbanded
or removed.
"
[Ref . 198] Without a clear, mutually agreed upon
level of troops in the region as of 18 November 1990, the
Soviet military can continue to withdraw equipment from the
area with impunity. They have subverted the whole point of
having a deadline after which forces in the area were to have
been counted and destroyed if above the agreed to limits.
Further high command bad faith is evidenced by their attempt
to save three divisions by reclassifying them as coastal
defense units, naval units, and so exempt from CFE related
ceilings [Ref. 199]. That the Soviet negotiating
posture was patently obstructionist was attested to by a
Western diplomat privy to the negotiations. "Since the Soviets
weren't really making it possible for us to do much
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substantive work we decided that the schedule of meetings
should reflect that".[Ref. 200] The military seems
to be putting the brakes on substantive arms cuts. The Bush
Administration has taken the slowdown in arms control
negotiations to be a reflection of the resurgence in the
Soviet military [Ref . 201] . Soviet military actions
are a strong countercurrent to Foreign Ministry policies.
It is not only through a sub rosa, renegade foreign policy
that the military is flexing its recovered influence. The
military establishment is muscling the Foreign Ministry out of
the official arms control process. It is trying to regain some
of the influence lost to the x new thinkers' in the early
Gorbachev years. The backhanded military influence on foreign
policy, as with the Novaya Zemlya blast, is now coupled with
greater input directly into the foreign policy process.
"Baker may be feeling nostalgic for the days of former
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who led the
arms control talks and was able to deliver important
concessions from the military. But since Mr. Shevardnadze
resigned in December under pressure from conservatives,
Foreign Ministry officials privately complain they no
longer have such clout. . .That was confirmed by the unusual
decision to place the Soviet arms control delegation
during the Baker visit under the direction of Gen. Mikhail
Moiseyev, the armed forces chief of general staff, rather
than a Foreign Ministry of ficial.
"
[Ref . 202]
The military elite, acting in its own interests, or those
it perceives as the state's interests, is undercutting the
administration's, the president's, foreign policy with its own
agenda. They are undercutting the foreign policy that let
Eastern Europe go free. The high command's views on Eastern
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Europe have become more pertinent as its influence has
increased and as its semi-autonomous foreign policy role has
become evident. The fact that the enemy of East European
independence, the Soviet military, is acting independently and
counter to reformist policies could serve as an inhibiter to
East European exercise of independence. The Czechs, Slovaks,
Poles, and Hungarians in any attempt to join Europe will be
negatively influenced by the growth in Soviet military
importance and the concomitant decline of the Soviet
reformists in foreign policy. This subversion and
supplantation of the more moderate Foreign Ministry stance in
Soviet Foreign Policy bodes ill for Western security, and
specifically for the possibility that it might be able to
extend its umbrella over the East European states.
C. SOVIET MILITARY AND EASTERN EUROPE
The conservatives in the USSR clearly see Soviet
interests as intimately tied up with events in Eastern Europe.
"As the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party labored over
their future course today, they confronted the tumult of
Eastern Europe as a lesson and a threat. Throughout a day
of impassioned debate, fears of Eastern Europe surfaced
again and again - stark fears that the new shape of
Europe, and especially Germany, could menace Soviet
security". [Ref. 203]
The civilian conservatives seem to see a shift of political
clout away from the USSR. In addition, the military sees a
continuing threat from NATO and the West, making the impetus
for military reform more cautious [Ref. 204].
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"As envisaged by the high command, military reform is to
be implemented cautiously, "so as not to harm, even for one
minute, the nation's defense capacity and the armed forces
"combat readiness. "" [Ref. 205] The perceived NATO
threat will almost certainly continue to be a justification
for calls for military parity and an obstacle for arms control
efforts. Chief of the General Staff, "Moieseev remained
cautious in his personal appraisal of the Western threat. He
warned that "the aggressive orientation of imperialist policy
has been maintained." He also charged that the United States
remained intent on equipping its troops with the "most modern
technologies" and weapons systems, and that countering these




A common refrain is that the West is trying to deal with
the USSR from a position of strength. Soviet Defense Minister,
Marshal Yazov, after listing various U.S. defense programs in
an interview, concluded that, "It's logical to assume that the
objectives are to give the U.S. the "position of strength," to
inspire fear in the Soviet Union and to demonstrate America '
s
ability to conduct offensive operations on a global
scale. "[Ref. 207] As says the Defense Minister, so
says the Ministry. This "view [of the West] inspires the
Defense Ministry's draft military reform plan. "There is no
guarantee against the irreversibility of the positive changes
in the world." the draft warns. A careful analysis, [Major
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General Sergei] Bogdanov [head of the center for operations
and strategic research of the General Staff] says, yields the
conclusion that NATO and the US continue to operate "from a
position of strength." Despite the "dramatic change" in Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe. NATO forces are unchanged, "and it
is quite dangerous to us.""[Ref. 208] Likewise
Marshal Akhromeyev bemoans 'NATO's unchanged structure*. "I
don't understand why under present conditions the Americans
preserve a military organization like NATO and refuse to carry
on reductions of naval forces - while the Soviet Union is
reducing all other kinds of arms."[Ref. 209] As if
to highlight Soviet concerns, the impressive American showing
in the war with Iraq has only heightened Soviet concerns
[Ref . 210] . A large part of Soviet military
resistance to the CFE treaty seems to stem from its contention
that the loss of the erstwhile Pact allies constitutes a net
increase for the West such that NATO's strength is 150 to 2 00
% greater than that of the USSR [Ref. 211]. The
Soviet military seems to be weighing the loss of the Warsaw
Pact [Ref. 212], the troop withdrawals from Eastern
Europe, and the unilateral cuts, against the perception that
NATO has not changed but has even been strengthened by the
addition of the former GDR [Ref. 213],
The picture that emerges of the Soviet high command's
worldview is one of nostalgia for the perceived better
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security of the past, and skepticism that perestroika •
s
political solutions to security problems are beneficial.
"Asked by a Soviet interviewer in February [1990] whether
withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland would not "bring harm to our defense,"
Lieutenant General Igor Sergeyev responded bluntly:
"Undoubtedly. Parity was calculated on the existing status
quo. Defensive doctrine counts on the present grouping and
deployment of troops. As we lose space, we come closer to
danger. If under parity someone loses, that means someone
else gains. The impending changes in the Warsaw Pact
certainly are a loss for us from the military point of
view. And all the theoretical dissertations about
replacing a military-political alliance with a political-
military one are little consolation.
"
[Ref. 214]
Sergeyev' s point of view reflects the attitude apparently held
by most of the high command. The fact that parity is still
held to be of paramount importance in the security equation,
as the general notes, implies a zero-sum understanding of the
Soviet security dilemma. Sergeyev points this out so that no
one can be mistaken. The democratic revolutions in Eastern
Europe are perceived to be a loss by the Soviet military
[Ref. 215] . Generals Makashov and Rodionov have
publicly bemoaned "the loss of our allies in
Europe". [Ref . 216] The "Southern Group of Forces
political chief Major General Ivan Mikulin. . .echoed Makashov's
charge that reform had surrendered Eastern Europe to its
ideological foes. "[Ref. 217] A neutralization or
Finlandization of Eastern Europe might be a loss to the Soviet
military but it would minimize any gain to the West. This
worldview stands as an obstruction to any sort of East-West
European security rapprochement.
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Coupled with the resurgence of the right, the most
alarming news to come out of the USSR with regard to Eastern
Europe has been Shevardnadze's revelation that the
conservatives advocated the use of force in 1989. He said of
this that, "There was of course an alternative. . .We were quite
actively pushed to use force, that is to resurrect the
doctrine under which a crisis of power in one country of the
'socialist community' must be overcome by military
intervention from the others. In other words, we were being
told to act, according to the scenarios of 1953, 1956 and
1968". [Ref. 218] The idea that those conservatives
who lobbied for the firm application of the Brezhnev doctrine
in 1989 are probably now in situations of increased power is
chilling. However, others have written that, "Even
Shevardnadze's outspoken military critics do not call for a
rollback to the old days". [Ref. 219] While no one,
not even the conservatives, might seriously be considering a
true rollback, a return to the Brezhnev doctrine; their
previous willingness to use force in Eastern Europe is
disconcerting. While not perhaps thinking of retaking Eastern
Europe, "Soviet military hard-liners are now talking about
repairing Shevardnadze's "mistakes. "" [Ref . 220]
The retention of the alternative to use force mixed with
the conservatives sense of loss of Eastern Europe is a
dangerous brew. Colonels Alksnis and Petrushenko, with the
tacit approval of the high command, are voicing the military
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elite perspective on the foreign policy which let Eastern
Europe go [Ref . 221] . "Alksnis accuses Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze of selling out Soviet interests to the United
States, of helping to "eliminate the Soviet Union as
superpower in the world arena. And this is all being achieved
without the use of force" ... [The West] "used to think of the
Soviet Union as Upper Volta with missiles. Now they think of
us just as Upper Volta. No one fears us. "[Ref. 222]
From this point of view any substantive European-wide
initiatives which brought the new democracies closer to the
West and further along the road to democratization would be a
slap in the face. The previously noted East European fears
resulting from the Baltic repression must have been music to
these conservative ears which had previously registered a lack
of respect.
The military retains an emotional commitment to Eastern
Europe and their prestige linked to the role of the Red Army
in the Great Patriotic War, an attitude which will be almost
impossible to eradicate [Ref. 223]. General Makashov
"complained that, "because of the so-called victories of our
diplomacy, the Soviet army is being driven without a fight out
of countries that our fathers liberated from fascism." Admiral
Gennadii Khvatov, the commander of the Pacific Fleet,
declared: "We have no allies in the West. We have no allies in
the East: Consequently, we are back where we were in
1939. ""[Ref. 224] An article written by a Soviet Army major to
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New Times entitled "Save our tanks!" is an example of the
zero-sum, continued-NATO-threat, compromise-is-weakness,
visceral military opposition to security reform which seems to
be prevalent in the upper echelons. "Aren't we being too
generous in selling off our national might? Will we feel
better if our poverty is aggravated by helplessness in the
world arena? Why did the Soviet team at the Vienna talks agree
that the USSR should retain thirty percent of its total
ceiling of conventional armaments deployed in Europe, as had
been suggested by NATO and stop insisting on the forty
percent?" [Ref. 225] The major fears that the "new
thinkers" are giving away the store [Ref. 226].
These attitudes, hostile as they are to political solutions to
the USSR's perceived security problems, would find much to
disagree with in East European movement towards the West. Such
a move would almost certainly be seen as hostile and
aggressive.
Interestingly enough the major says that, "One NATO tank
crew consisting of professional soldiers is capable of
challenging 2 to 3 Soviet tanks with unprofessional crews. And
in modern warfare people are the decisive factor! Which side
will have more tanks as a result then?", and he points out
that 5,000 German vehicles blew by 20,000 Soviet ones in 1941
[Ref. 227]. The results of the Gulf war inevitably
must have reinforced this last opinion. Retired General Odom,
U.S. Army, seems to share this view. "What the Gulf war shows
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them [the Soviets] is that the training competency required
for soldiers and field-grade officers is not easy to obtain -
and, when you have it, it's awesome. . .You are not going to
deal with" an army of this kind with "two year draftees.""
[Ref. 228] The high command may be retaining its numbers
advantage over NATO because it recognizes NATO superiority and
the need to counter it with numbers.
The East Europeans and Soviet reformists are concerned
over the conservative perspective on Eastern Europe and over
the conservative comeback.
"Andrei Kozyrev, the liberal Foreign Minister of the
Russian Republic, warned, "If the forces of darkness
prevail in the Soviet Union, Central Europe is next on
their agenda." In Poland, Lech Walesa sees a "deadly
threat" on the horizon. The First Deputy Minister of
Interior of Czechoslovakia, Jan Ruml, warns of "the
state terrorism of Soviet forces, which, under certain
circumstances, could destabilize the situation in the
former Communist countries . " Although Moscow may be
economically and politically too weak to crush these
new democracies, its capacity to create instability is
considerable. . .What lends credence to Central European
concerns most is the Soviet debate about who "lost"
eastern Germany and the rest of what was the Soviet
bloc. . .Having experienced upheaval at home and retreat
abroad, hard-liners also want the Soviet Union treated
with respect. They want no more anti-communist
rhetoric from former allies, no declarations of
support for Lithuania, no talk about joining NATO
[emphasis added] . To heal the country's wounded pride,
they call for a large dose of Soviet assertiveness
abroad. "[Ref. 229]
It would appear, from our discussion of military attitudes and
from Mr. Gati's analysis, that the very stability of the East
European countries is threatened.
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Considering Gorbachev's turn to the right, in Chapter II,
led to the conclusion that the repression in the Baltics did
not of itself portend badly for overall European security.
This subsequent examination of increasing Soviet military
power and of the high command's stance with regard to Eastern
Europe leads to the assessment that arms control accords, and
East-West rapprochement might not be easily accomplished. The
section on civil-military relations revealed a continuing
antipathy between Gorbachev and the military elite in Foreign
Policy, despite their collusion on internal policies. The
sections on the independent foreign policy conducted by the
military, and its feeling of loss over Eastern Europe point
towards prolonged high command resistance to East European
independence and stability.
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IV. WITHDRAWAL & LEVERAGE
A. WITHDRAWAL
The sense of loss of Eastern Europe felt by the military
elite is engendered by their withdrawal from the region. The
military position on parity with the West, and its objections
to Gorbachev's giving up of Soviet capabilities without
commensurate NATO measures have already been examined. Their
opposition to the reformist course in Eastern Europe was
further aggravated by the results of the 1989 revolutions.
"Gorbachev established a two-year timetable for the Soviet
reductions, but before that period was even half finished,
the rapid pace of political change in the region overtook
them. That was when the new rulers in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary demanded that all Soviet military forces be
withdrawn from their countries. Instead of the 50,000-
strong reduction in the Group of Forces anticipated by the
Soviet General Staff in 1988, the generals were now




This apparently unforseen side-effect of novoi mvshlenie . (new
thinking) , exacerbated military opposition to Gorbachev.
"There were two major consequences of this
[withdrawals] . On the one hand, it led to increasingly
vocal opposition to Gorbachev's security policy by
members of the High Command... By the time of the
Twenty-eighth Party Congress in July, the withdrawal
from Eastern Europe was under way, and attacks by
military leaders on Gorbachev's security policies had
assumed a virulence unprecedented in Soviet
history. . .the officer corps spent the first half of
1990 struggling with the strategic and organizational
implications of the withdrawal from Eastern
Europe". [Ref . 231]
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The pullback to Soviet territory of the Groups of Soviet
Forces was the touchstone for discontent over other military
related matters. In addition, it was the rapidity, the
perceived precipitous nature of the reductions which so
alarmed the high command. "Also, certain officers,
specifically Generals Tretyak and Chabanov go so far as to
criticize the current doctrinal orientation towards
"defensive" arms and the counter-offensive limited to the
retaking of national territory, while contesting the rapidity
of unilateral Soviet troop reductions in Eastern
Europe. "{Translation by this writer.}, [Ref. 2 32]
The Soviet generals seem to be looking for an "orderly
withdrawal of the Red Army from the glacis to its sanctuary".
[Ref. 233] and dislike the way the withdrawals are
being conducted. They feel humiliated by the withdrawals:
"Many Soviet officers stationed in Eastern Europe are
resentful of the "humiliating" way their former allies are
asking them to leave. "" [Ref . 234] They feel that the
withdrawals are evident of a defeat, without as General
Makashov said, having given the Red Army an opportunity to
fight [Ref. 235].
Celestine Bohlen has written a good summary of the
situation from both the East European and the Soviet military
point of view.
"President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's recent tilt toward hard-
liners in the Soviet military and the Communist Party has
raised concerns in Eastern Europe that their new-found
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independence may somehow be jeopardized by their giant
neighbor's political instability. Although the withdrawal
of 123,000 Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia
has continued on schedule, negotiations over the departure
date for 50,000 Soviet soldiers in Poland have bogged down
in recent months, while the Soviet parliament has still
not given its approval to the treaty guaranteeing German
reunification. For East Europeans who worry that the
Soviet Union has not reconciled itself to its loss of
influence in the region, the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact had become an increasingly urgent issue. By the same
token, their Soviet counterparts have been increasingly




During the period of new thinking ascendancy, the military had
to acquiesce to the withdrawals from Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. Now that the military has gained more of a
voice, it is its intractability that has marked the talks with
Poland over troop withdrawals from that country. This change
in tone has been evident with regard to the other countries
but to a lesser degree than with their Northern neighbor.
"There are disturbing signs of a hardening Soviet attitude
toward the former satellites, particularly Poland. Most
alarming is the uncertainty over when - or if - Soviet
troops will leave the region. Having agreed last year to
withdraw from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by mid-1991 and
from eastern Germany by mid-1994, the Soviet Union now
says it will not pull out of Poland until after its large
contingent leaves Germany.
"
[Ref . 2 37]
One bit of evidence of this hardening attitude is General
Viktor Dubinin's refusal to accede to Polish demands for a
quick withdrawal. He is the commander of Soviet troops in
Poland and chief Soviet negotiator in the withdrawal talks
[Ref. 238]. "He announced that his men would
withdraw when and how they wanted: "We will be leaving with
our heads high, with banners spread, satisfied that we have
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fulfilled an internationalist duty." [Ref. 239] (The
departure of the first Soviet troops from Poland on 9 April
1991 was marked with a brass band [Ref. 240].) The
general is still using Communist terminology to justify the
Soviet presence. But he made clear the real reason for the
retention of troops in Poland. "To leave Soviet forces in
Germany completely cut off from the territory of the U.S.S.R.
is inadmissable". [Ref . 241]
There is a discrepancy between the way the Soviet generals
view events in Eastern Europe and the actual political
realities in the region. The general, and not any general but
the commander of all Soviet troops in Poland, does not evince
the sensibility of someone who is on the territory of a
sovereign state and there at its sufferance. In his mind
Eastern Europe seems to remain the Soviet military manoeuvre
area that it was a few years ago. The national boundaries do
not seem to hold any great significance for him.
Poland's Foreign Minister Skubiszewski noted this Soviet
military myopia. He referred to incidents when Soviet troop
trains from Germany arrived at the Polish-German border for
transit to the Soviet Union in the absence of any
understanding between the Poles and Soviets over how such
transits might be conducted. "One cannot have a situation
where a train arrives at the border and the driver calls out:
"We are coming through now." This has to be arranged with
Poland beforehand, not just with Germany. I fear that the
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military people in Moscow do not understand that, but they
will have to. The sooner they understand it, the better for
our relations"
.
[Ref. 242] There is some backbone
behind the Polish position. In January of 1991 they refused
transit rights for 30 Soviet trains [Ref. 243]. The
military seem to be operating in the business as usual mode
and are disregarding the fact that the Pact is no longer
functional, and that the East European state's sovereignty
have to be reckoned with.
As an example of the humiliations with which the Red Army
feels it is oppressed, General Dubinin reacted strongly to
Polish demands that Soviet troops transiting from Germany
travel in sealed cars without weapons.
"Gen. V. Dubinin accused the Polish side of treating
Soviet troops as an army of occupation and wanting to
escort them out of Poland as prisoners of war [the feeling
of defeat again], "in locked and sealed railway cars,
disarmed, and carrying no military equipment," thus
bringing dishonor on the army which liberated us and
vanquished the Nazis, which "returned East Pomerania, East
Prussia, and Silesia to Polish people to hold in
perpetuity, and also established Poland's western border
along the Odra and Nysa [Oder-Neisse] , " and which,
moreover, acting out of internationalist duty, for 45
years "protected and defended your country without
charge. "[Ref. 244]
This feeling of humiliation is likely to continue to be
exacerbated because the Poles are insisting on the sealed
trains and disarmed troops [Ref. 245]. In addition
they want all dangerous cargo, including nuclear weapons, to
go by sea [Ref. 246]. They want about $16,000 per each of the
estimated 11,000 troop trains required to move the Group of
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Soviet Forces in Germany [Ref. 247]. Lastly, they
insist on inspecting the rail and road convoys
[Ref. 248].
Events in Poland are obviously tied up with the issue of
Soviet troops in the former GDR. The Military cannot
countenance the idea that the Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany would be cut off from the USSR [Ref. 249].
The Soviets have however unveiled a detailed withdrawal plan
for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG)
[Ref. 250]. According to this schedule the GSFG
should all be gone by the end of 1994 [Ref. 251].
The GSFG was slated to provide 75% of the troops cut as part
of Gorbachev's unilateral personnel reduction initiative of
1988 [Ref. 252]. This move was halted, presumably at
the behest of the high command, due to the subsequent
withdrawal demands made by Hungary and Czechoslovakia
[Ref. 253]. Only when further cuts in the GSFG could be linked
to Western cuts as part of the CFE process were the GSFG
reductions continued [Ref. 254]. The GSFG seems to
have been used as an asset both in the CFE negotiations and in
the reunification talks with the germans [Ref. 255].
The time for the GSFG to be counted as an asset may, however,
be ending. It is becoming more of a liability as time goes on.
Some of the liability is financial. Despite German
contributions as part of the reunification package the GSFG
probably cost something in the order of $800,000,000 every 6
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months [Ref . 256] . The military housing shortage,
also somewhat mitigated by the reunification accord, is
nevertheless acute and likely to worsen as troops return home
[Ref. 257]. Notwithstanding all this, the greatest
liability seems to be in the deterioration of the GSFG, and
its estrangement from local Germans. SACEUR, General Galvin,
during a recent visit to the USSR said of the Soviet high
command that "they're bothered, to say the least, by the poor
relationship between the soldiers and local
Germans. " [Ref . 258] The former East Germans are
especially anti-Soviet. "Now and then right-wing thugs attack
an officer or a sentry, but more often the attitude
is a dismissive pity. These are not men to be feared anymore -
but neither are they to be helped. In contrast to western
Germany, where people have mounted a large-scale effort to
ship emergency food to the Soviet Union, the resentment here
in the former East Germany is still fresh enough to reject any
such notion.
"
[Ref . 259] Violent incidents are not
rampant but are widespread enough and publicized enough that
anger is building up on the Soviet side. A Soviet major
described "a recent shooting incident, later confirmed by
German officials, in which German hoodlums fired on a sentry
who fired back with an automatic weapon, wounding a German.
Such incidents are not rare, the major intimates, and they
feed a bunker mentality. "We'll protect our soldiers if we
have to, whatever it takes," the major snarls. " [Ref . 260] One
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Soviet soldier has reportedly been killed, while 13 incidents
of shootings or beatings of Soviet soldiers occurred in the
fall of 1990 [Ref. 261]. As the major's example illustrates,
such incidents are certain to touch raw Soviet military nerves
already sensitized to any intimation of 'humiliation'. One
Bonn official said that, "We expect very serious
trouble. "[Ref. 262]
The combination of injured Soviet hubris and German
resentment is not the only liability related to the continued
presence of the GSFG in that country. The Soviet forces are
undergoing a massive reduction in combat capability as their
discipline suffers from reunification. There have been large
numbers of desertions. Der Speigel reported 200 in one week
alone in November [Ref. 263]. There were 800 deaths
in the GSFG in 1990, many from suicide and murder by comrades
in arms [Ref. 264]. The terrible conditions of service for
conscripts in the GSFG which have induced the suicides and the
desertions up to now, could serve, along with the new
proximity of the West, to greatly increase the numbers of
deserters [Ref. 265]. The desertion problem creates
a particularly flammable situation in that Soviet detachments
are sent out to catch the deserters [Ref. 2 66] . The
collision of an aggressive detachment of Soviet soldiers and
an antagonistic populace seems to be a matter of time under
these circumstances. The unit coherence, discipline, and
morale of the GSFG is suffering, as a result both the Germans
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and the Soviets are worried over the possibility of wholesale
disorder [Ref. 267]. The Germans would like a more
rapid Soviet withdrawal. Chancellor Kohl has said that Soviet
troops could be out of Germany by the end of 1992
[Ref. 268]. The situation seems to call for a quick
withdrawal, but the Soviet military would probably see this as
another humiliation.
Notwithstanding Soviet denials to the contrary, their
troops in Germany seem to be selling off their equipment
including weapons of all types [Ref. 269]. The fact
that the troops are paid in marks seems to have fostered the
breakdown in order as troops attempt to enrich themselves as
quickly as possible before they return to the USSR and its
grim financial realities [Ref. 270]. The title of an
article in the New York Times says it all: "Soviet Troops in
Germany Become Army of Refugees"
.
[Ref . 271] Polish
concerns stem from this image of chaos in the GSFG. "Gloom-
mongers fear that the withdrawal will happen chaotically,
perhaps after a coup in the Soviet Union or a bust-up in the
Soviet Army. No one wants to see more than lm leaderless
Soviet citizens scrambling across Poland, but no one knows how
to prevent it either.
"
[Ref . 272]
Whether the Soviet military will come to see that it is in
its interest to rapidly withdraw from Germany is hard to say.
It seems that the longer the GSFG stays in place, the more it
will degrade, and the more likely will be a major
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conflagration between the troops and the local populace.
Soviet military pride would dictate a slow dignified pull-out.
These other considerations would have to be weighed against
the need to avoid x humiliations
.
In contrast to the situation in Poland and Germany, the
troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary are going
better but still generate military resentment. Speaking of the
fact that the Soviet military had gained a greater voice in
the USSR, the Polish Foreign minister said that, "Because of
the domestic situation in the USSR, it is now being said that
it was a mistake to conclude agreements about withdrawing the
Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
"
[Ref. 273] The
apparently greater military influence and these kinds of
revelations about Soviet military attitudes must make the
Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians happy that they made troop
withdrawal agreements earlier. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union signed their troop withdrawal accord on 26 february 1990
[Ref. 274]. Hungary and the USSR signed their
agreement on 10 March 1990 [Ref. 275]. Both
agreements specified phased pull-outs to be complete by 30
June 1991 [Ref. 276].
The withdrawals have not gone off without a hitch. Hungary
and the USSR have bickered over the payment terms for Soviet
facilities left behind [Ref. 277]. The environmental
damage caused by the long-term Soviet troop presence and
Hungarian demands for compensation have likewise been sore
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points [Ref. 278]. The command of the Southern Group
of Soviet forces (SGSF) expressed dissatisfaction with
provisions of the withdrawal accord that had been developed by
the Soviet Foreign Ministry [Ref. 279]. Criticism
over the lack of provisions made for the disposition of Soviet
facilities seems to have been the primary complaint. Izvestia
published an account of the waste of soviet taxpayers money as
a result of Hungarian insistence that any infrastructure
improvements made by the USSR in Hungary are offset by the
ecological damage done by Soviet troops [Ref. 280]
.
The dispute reached a head with Colonel General Matvey
Burlakov' s, Chief of the SGSF, statement that the continued
withdrawal of Soviet troops was predicated upon resolution of
the facilities compensation question. "The commander of the
Soviet troops stationed in Hungary has threatened to halt the
Soviet troop withdrawal, unless the Hungarian Government pays
for the vacated barracks. . .Burlakov also criticized the Soviet
Government for not coming to an agreement with the Hungarian
leadership so far." [Ref. 281] Burlakov was later
heard to state that this was just a personal opinion intended
to hasten the conclusion of an agreement [Ref. 282].
The only foreseeable solution seems to be the Hungarian
preference for a canceling out of debts by both parties.
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"Hungarian Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Antal Annus,
the government's commissioner in charge of Soviet
withdrawal. . .pointed out to his Soviet colleague, that the
"occupiers" are either unwilling or unable to accept the fact
that hungary has its own interests and is not prepared to
subordinate them to those of "big brother." To be sure,
Burlakov and his advisors are not accustomed to dealing with
negotiators as outspoken and firm as the Hungarians, and such
a role must be new to the Hungarians themselves. One cannot
help nut feel that, in the end, the "zero payment" alternative
might be preferred, so that no money will be
involved. "[Ref. 283]
As with Poland and Germany, the relationship between the
Soviet military and the civilian population in Hungary is
tense. The military has not been cooperative in enabling a
smooth transition for Soviet bases in the country to civilian
use. "Soviet military authorities did not allow Veszprem civic
leaders to inspect the condition of the Soviet base there
despite repeated requests. In another case, the Soviet Army
invited a delegation from the city of Szolnok to make a fact-
finding visit to the three Soviet barracks within city limits.
When the Hungarians arrived, the Soviet base commander told
them that the Southern Group of Soviet Forces Headquarters had
not consented to the visit. "[Ref. 284] Soviet
soldiers in Hungary are also reportedly selling military
equipment including weapons [Ref. 285]. Zoltan D.
Barany summed up the situation with the following.
"The Soviets are clearly very tense and uncertain during
the current withdrawals. Not only do they see that the
Hungarians are often clearly antagonistic, sending the
departing troops on their way east with anti-Soviet
slogans sounding in their ears, but the returning soldiers
pose a serious problem for the
Soviets." [Ref . 286]
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The situation in Czechoslovakia is similar. The Czechs
have also had problems with Soviet soldiers selling off their
weapons for personal profit. Firearms and grenades seem to be
readily available [Ref. 287]. There is also
considerable resentment of the Soviets. Anti-Soviet slogans
and graffiti are on the buildings [Ref. 288]. As in
the other areas there is concern over the ecological damage
done by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia [Ref. 289].
There has been some, apparently low level, resistance to Czech
attempts to determine the extent of ecological damage on
Soviet bases [Ref. 290] . On the whole the withdrawal
in Czechoslovakia seems to be going quickly. The Soviets,
according to Colonel General Vorob'ev, commander of Soviet
forces in Czechoslovakia, should be out of the country by 20
May 1990 [Ref. 291]. This would be a month early.
However, there is resistance to the idea of Soviet troops from
the GSFG withdrawing through Czechoslovakia
[Ref. 292]. Subsequently, however, in a conciliatory move,
Czechoslovakia offered to allow Soviet troops from the GSFG to
transit home via its territory once all troops of the Central
Group of Soviet Forces (CGSF) had been removed
[Ref. 293]. Whether the Soviet high command will be
amenable to this offer is doubtful. Soviet troops would be
transiting Czechoslovakia without any in-country friendly
personnel. The Soviet military objected to this situation in
Poland; that is where the GSFG would have been 'cut off from
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the USSR [Ref. 294]. The CGSF's early withdrawal
would seem to indicate that the Soviet high command has
written off Czechoslovakia. The same is probably true of
Hungary with its June 29 termination for withdrawal of the
Southern Group of Soviet Forces (SGSF) [Ref. 295].
B. LEVERAGE
Given the troop withdrawals, how much influence does the
Soviet military retain in Eastern Europe? Does it retain the
levers necessary to move the East and West Europeans as it
desires? Soviet forces in place are obviously the easiest way
to influence Europe. (This understanding seems to have
influenced Soviet Colonel Nicolai Petrushenko ' s call for a 16
to 19 year withdrawal timetable vice the 4 years to pull-out
from Germany and Poland [Ref. 296].) The SGSF and
the CGSF will be gone by June and May of 1991. Hungary and
Czechoslovakia will then be able to act with more independence
than Poland and even Germany. In the latter two countries'
cases, the Soviets will retain a de facto veto on any moves
which they deem injurious to their interests for the duration
of the presence of Soviet troops on their soil. Accordingly,
Polish and German policy will likely be subdued until 1994 by
the Soviet presence.
This presence, by its very existence would seem to dampen
'host' country moves which would be seen negatively by the
Soviet military elite. However, other more active pressures
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could be applied. During the period when the Soviet Foreign
Ministry and the new thinkers ran foreign policy, the East
Europeans were not, seemingly, interfered with. Soviet
military units in Hungary, for example, did not conduct
exercises during elections in that country
[Ref. 297]. In addition, exercises in the former GDR were
curtailed in space and number of troops involved. They were
restricted to military training areas and to no more than
13,000 troops [Ref. 298]. Low-level, supersonic, and
night aircraft flights were likewise restricted in number
[Ref. 299]. Now that the military, old-thinking, wing has
regained prominence, it is not hard to imagine that Soviet
forces muscle flexing in Poland or Germany might be used to
influence those countries. This could include delays on troop
withdrawals, military exercises and the like. Whether
agitation by the ever weakening GSFG would decisively
influence Germany is another matter. What is important is that
the Soviet military not be led to believe that such posturing
might work.
Another relatively short-term Soviet influence lever is
the continuing East European dependence on Soviet made and
designed military equipment. The East Europeans must still use
Soviet made parts and training to keep their militaries
functioning [Ref. 300], The present economic
difficulties of these countries means that they cannot afford
massive restructuring of their materiel base. This equipment
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dependency will probably be lessened with time. Aside from
purely national interest reasons the East Europeans will
probably diversify their equipment sources because the Soviets
are demanding payments in dollars and at non-subsidized prices
for their military goods [Ref . 301]
.
A western initiative which would mitigate the equipment
dependency would be for Germany to offer the former East
German Army (NVA) equipment to the East Europeans. Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have all expressed interest in
this equipment [Ref. 302], The Bundeswehr discovered
five divisions worth of equipment held as a mobilization base
in the GDR [Ref. 303]. Germany could certainly
dispense with this equipment. If the West wanted to tightly
control levels of conventional arms in Eastern Europe, then
this equipment could be parcelled out as necessary solely to
serve as a spare parts base thereby weaning the East from its
interim dependence on the USSR.
Another dependence, aside from that of equipment, is that
of habit. The East European military establishments were in
the habit of depending on the Soviet military for direction.
They were internationalist in orientation. That is, as will be
seen, the training and practice for war conducted in the
Warsaw Pact since World War Two lent itself by design to East
European dependence upon Soviet guidance. This will have to be
overcome to prevent the Soviet military from furthering its
goals. If the East European militaries continue to ally
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themselves with the Soviet military, then independent East
European security policies will be impossible. Given the
fractious nature of the erstwhile Pact allies' negotiations
over their respective slices of the CFE pie
[Ref. 3 04] this will probably not be a great obstacle.
However, three impediments to East European military
attitudinal movement from internationalism to nationalism seem
to exist. They are; military elite identification with the
USSR military; vestigial remains of old relationships to the
USSR; and budget cuts which are mandated by bad economic
conditions.
The close ties of the East European military leadership to
the Soviet Union is of concern in assessing the possibility of
Soviet military influence. The Czech armed forces were
basically denationalized after the events of 1968. They became
an adjunct, auxiliary force to the Central Group of Soviet
Forces [Ref. 302]. To a great extent, those
Hungarian officers that had studied at higher military schools
in the USSR remained loyal to it during the 1956 uprising.
Their indoctrination, personal contacts with Soviet officers,
and the fact that they owed their position and status to the
communist party led them to pro-Soviet or neutral stances
[Ref. 303]. These characteristics are common to all
the former Pact countries. A study of the erstwhile Warsaw
Pact made the distinction between functional and attudinal
integration of the East European militaries into the Soviet
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Forces [Ref. 304]. The study concluded that the highest levels
of the East European militaries were attudinally integrated
but that lower levels were only functionally integrated
[Ref. 305]. The use of training held in the USSR was
important to this result [Ref. 306]. Those East
European military cadres that were loyal to the USSR, that
suffered as a result of the decay of Soviet power must hope
for a reversal in present trends.
In all of this discussion it should be kept in mind that
Romania has followed its own interests for some time, and has
not been a Soviet puppet in its foreign and military policy.
"Romania has not, of course, actively participated in the
military command of the Pact since the late
1960s ." [Ref . 307] Romania has long had an
independent military doctrine, has distanced itself from
obligations to the Soviet Union, and its defensive posture
entails the mobilization of the populace to defend the nation
[Ref. 308], The Romanian leadership, apparently alarmed at
Krushchev's recklessness during the Cuban Missile Crisis,
"expressed contingent neutrality [in 1963] to the United
States". [Ref . 309] Romania offered assurances that
it would not participate in any offensive against the West,
and as a measure of good faith, indicated that it would permit
inspection of its territory to verify the non-presence of
Soviet nuclear weapons [Ref. 310]. Romanian
dissatisfaction with Soviet leadership of the Pact, as
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expressed in the mid-1960s [Ref. 311], and its
concomitant foreign policy reveal a long-standing independence
which should preclude Soviet military influence.
The problem for the present regimes is that a part of
their military personnel, while not being nationalists, have
skills which cannot be dispensed with. In Poland purges of the
nomenklatura have been tempered because the new government
does not have people to fill their posts [Ref. 312].
This is even more true of the military because of the need for
specialized skills and experience. Solidarity member turned
Deputy Defense Minister Janusz Onyskiewicz commented soon
after getting the post that despite affiliations with the
communist party, military members would not be purged because
of their political associations. He asserts that military
promotions were due more to competence than to political
characteristics [Ref. 313]. He also underlines the
point that he and his colleagues were ignorant of defense
issues, implying a need to rely on the professional military
[Ref. 314].
A disturbing trend is that the new regimes want military
ties with the USSR. They hope to continue sending at least
some officers to Soviet military schools. A complete rupture
is clearly not envisaged. In Hungary's case Prime Minister
"Antall and Gorbachev agreed in principle on concluding a
bilateral agreement, in which military cooperation could also
be involved, ".. .An agreement of this kind would make it
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possible for some Hungarian officers to be trained in the
Soviet Union. "There are some special fields which we could not
replace at the moment"
.
[Ref . 315] In Poland's case
Onyszkiewicz has said, "We want to keep sending our officers
to military academies in the CSFR, Hungary, and the Soviet
Union, although not to all the academies and perhaps not in
such numbers as in the past."[Ref. 316] Poland
specifically wants to continue sending senior officers to the
Voroshilov Academy [Ref. 317], Similar to the
Hungarian hopes for a military agreement with the Soviet
Union, Poland would like to get a mutual defense treaty with
that country [Ref. 318]. Poland's concern over
German reunification is understandable as a motive for close
defense ties with the USSR. However the idea of bilateral
defense agreements between the East European militaries and
their old Soviet masters does not seem propitious in terms of
maximizing national sovereignty. The same is true for sending
officers to schools in the USSR. While there they will be
vulnerable to compromise. Any officer presently senior enough
to attend the Voroshilov Academy is certainly more
internationalist than junior officers. The stay there would
likely reinforce this tendency at the cost of patriotic
impulses.
This fact allied with the presence of Soviet troops on
East European soil and the fact that much of the military
remains in the hands of officers promoted by the former regime
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have been cause for concern [Ref . 319] . As an
example of ties which bind East European commanders with their
Soviet military counterparts, the Czech Chief of the National
Security Corps District Administration in Michalovce confers
regularly with KGB officials at his office in Czechoslovakia
[Ref. 320] . Whether it is extortion, habit, genuine belief in
Soviet 'internationalism', or a failure to perceive which way
events are proceeding, some individuals within the East
European national security establishments are unreliable and
some are traitors to their nationality.
Another issue is the problem of diminishing defense
budgets in the three countries. Poland's Army Chief of Staff
recently complained about the budget describing it as a
survival budget for the military [Ref. 321].
Poland's Minister of Defense, Kolodziejczyk, with images of
Soviet repression in nearby Lithuania in mind, has said that
without adequate funds the military will not be able to defend
all Poland's borders [Ref. 322]. This was an obvious
reference to the fact that Polish troops are poised on its
Western Borders but not equipped to defend the East.
Onyszkiewicz said of this that, "We have to take into
consideration the danger of local tensions. Without a shadow
of doubt the present deployment of our military units has to
be altered and in part this is slowly being done. A serious
change would entail enormous costs which the Polish state is
just not able to meet. A transfer of a single division to a
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new location costs about a trillion zlotys.
"
[Ref . 323] This
situation must have left Polish defense figures feeling
exposed during Soviet military movements in Lithuania.
The Czechs are also running up against the same problem.
Defense Minister Dobrovsky said that the ministry's job was to
uniformly defend the territory of the state but that to do
this certain needs [read enough money] had to be met
[Ref. 324]. Cuts in the Czech defense budget are said to be
slowing the pace of military reform and inhibiting the
relocation of troops to Slovakia and Eastern portions of the
country [closer to the USSR] [Ref. 325]. Hungary's
Defense Minister in appealing to the National Assembly,
underlined the idea that the Ministry would not be able to
meet its obligations without adequate funding
[Ref. 326]. The Bulgarian armed forces' budget has
likewise suffered cuts [Ref. 327], These financial
restrictions directly effect the deterrent posture of the
countries militaries vis a vis the USSR. By inhibiting reform,
and threatening the military, budget cuts destabilize the
interest of the military to ally itself with the new regimes.
A defense ministry that felt that it had nothing to loose
because it was going to be financially strangled could be very
dangerous for the new states.
Different tactics are being used to combat possible areas
of Soviet influence or agitation. First among them is the
dismissal of the oldest and most penetrated military
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officials. Onyszkiewicz has said of Poland's case that 35
generals would be cut in 1990, a like number in 1991, and that
significant numbers of colonels would see the same fate
[Ref. 328]. In Czechoslovakia all generals over 60 years old
have been retired. 6,000 veterans forced out in 1968 have been
rehabilitated and form a pool of 'democratic' military
expertise for the regime to call upon [Ref. 329].
For example, the Military Education University in Bratislava
is now headed by a Lieutenant Colonel who had been forced out
of service in 1968 [Ref. 330]. The Hungarians had
cut 50 high ranking officers as early as 1989
[Ref. 331], Bulgaria cut its high command by over half. It
retired 78 generals in 1990 to leave a total of 75
[Ref. 332].
Another tactic has been the increase of civilian control
over defense matters.
"The new noncommunist governments of Eastern Europe,
particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, are
wrestling with the problems of transforming their Soviet-
model military establishments into national institutions
serving national interests and responsible to national
political authority. In 1990 all five non-Soviet members
of the Warsaw Pact replaced their Defense Ministers. Among
those forces out of office was Bulgaria's General Dobri
Dzhurov, who, having been in office since February 1962,
had the distinction of being the longest-serving Minister
of Defense in the World. Czechoslovakia and hungary
appointed civilians and former dissidents to head their
military establishments. Poland appointed two civilian
Solidarity members as Deputy Ministers of
Defense. "[Ref. 333]
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The Hungarian and Czechoslovak civilian defense ministers are
Fur [Ref. 334] and Dobrovsky [Ref. 335].
In Poland the two civilian deputy defense ministers are,
Onyszkiewicz and Komorowski [Ref. 336] . It is hard
to say why Walesa retained Vice Admiral Kolodziejczyk as
Minister of Defense [Ref. 337]. It may have been a
compromise with the military.
Aside from the highest military cadre, there has been
movement away from internationalism. The biggest step taken
has been the depoliticization of the armed services in each
country [Ref. 338]. Major General Slimak, Czech
Chief of the General Staff said in March of 1990 that the
first significant change undertaken by the Army was the
abandonment of the leading role of the party
[Ref. 339]. The small reminders of party power such
as the comrade appellation were dropped. The Hungarians
announced the end of the party membership prerequisite for
officers in 1989 [Ref. 340]. In Poland, as in the
other countries, military members are prohibited from party
affiliation and the Main Political Administration has been
abolished [Ref. 341]. The Czech law on military service of 14
March 1990 prohibits party activity while serving but also
severely limits any possibility that the armed forces could
lawfully be used internally [Ref. 342]. There seems
to be a groundswell among the Bulgarian officer corps, as
evidenced by the formation of
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the Bulgarian Legion "Georgi Stoikov Rakovski", desirous of
greater professionalism and depol it icizat ion
[Ref. 343].
There is reason to believe that, party membership
notwithstanding, a good portion of the officer corps was
opportunistic and not motivated by ideology. In Hungary 27% of
those applying for admission to military colleges "were
motivated by the good earning potential
,
good opportunities
for relaxation and enjoyment, good-looking uniforms and other
material advantages of being in the service, rather than
professional or ideological motivations"
.
[Ref . 344]
The internationalist trustworthiness of the junior officers
and NCO's was deemed questionable in 1986
[Ref. 345] . As regards the conscripts, they were
assessed as being unreliable from a Soviet point of view
[Ref. 346]. There was obviously a large number who had not
bought into the system. Another factor in Hungary was the
barely concealed nationalism used in the armed forces to
motivate the troops. This led to the military being the most
nationalistic group in the country [Ref. 347]. As a
result of the fragmentation of the Czechoslovakian People's
Army and its subordination to the Central Group of Soviet
Forces after 1968 its adherence to internationalist
motivations was nonexistent [Ref. 348]. In Poland
the officers and NCOs were motivated largely by "pragmatic
considerations — career opportunities and various perquisites
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— rather than on ideological beliefs.
"
[Ref. 349]
This group was said to make up about 50% of the cadre, while
30% was nationalistic, and 20% internationalistic or pro-
Soviet [Ref. 350] . The Polish conscripts were anti-
Soviet and anti-communist [Ref. 351]. Bulgaria's
conscripts seem to show anti-service attitudes, interest in
things western, and pragmatic vice ideological concerns, which
would be fertile ground for national vice internationalist
ideology [Ref. 352]. As regards the Bulgarian
professional military cadre, it did not seem to be monolithic
in its support of the USSR in the past. The 1965 coup attempt,
and critical military press accounts point to some resentment
of the former Soviet patron [Ref. 353]. The
Bulgarian military is probably more interested in looking for
favorable solutions to its own security problems than in
supporting the Soviet military.
The reason for pointing out the facts noted in the
previous paragraph is that they demonstrate the degree of
internationalism-nationalism prevalent in the military
establishments prior to the events of 1989 and 1990. In all
cases the conscript base reflects societal attitudes and is
anti-Soviet and more or less nationalistic. The professional
cadres, taking into account those already winnowed out, can
probably be characterized as opportunistic. Ideology did not
mean anything to most of them under the communist regimes. One
would think that nationalism would generate a more effective
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appeal to these people. Some of them may indeed be true
nationalists. On the whole one would have to say that
attitudes in the military must have facilitated their relative
non-intervention in the events of 1989-90.
"Overall, the military forces in Eastern Europe came
through the revolutions of 1989 with flying
colors. . .Ultimately the armies showed their close ties to
the people and responded more to their national rather
than their ideological roots. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany they were used to disarm the party
militias that might have been tempted to resist political
reforms by force of arms. In Romania, the army defended
the revolution against the securitate secret police, so
that interim President Ion Illiescu could tell the nation
that "the army has been and remains the shield of hope for
the people and the revolution." Polish Navy Commodore
Antoni Rudoman, addressing the 4,000 people taking part in
Father Jankowski's Mass for the armed forces, said that
the traditional Polish military motto of "God, Honor, and
the Fatherland" described the highest values that should
be in the heart of every Pole in uniform. Military leaders
in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany have all
stressed that their forces served to defend the nation,
and not any particular political
party. "[Ref. 354]
Since the installation of new regimes all sections of the
militaries have probably become substantially more
nationalistic than they were in the mid-1980s. The patriots
are revealing their true colors and the opportunists see how
the wind is blowing and have certainly realized that the
Soviets are no longer their masters.
Given the threat of an increasingly hardline Soviet stance
those East European military leaders and apparatchiks that
have lost power due to the reforms certainly would welcome a
reversal of events, a return of Soviet influence. The
cashiered generals, and colonels would likely look forward to
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a reversion to the old situation. However the younger leaders
that have been promoted in their stead stand to loose if the
regime suffers. The conscripts and younger NCOs and officers
are probably well along the way towards a nationalistic
stance. In a confrontation with the USSR they would probably
react aggressively. However there is a danger that the
military will become isolated from society, disregarded
because of its role in martial law in Poland, or in the
uprisings in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A drifting military,
without ties to a democratically inclined populace is probably
more likely to follow leaders that would use it against the
state's interests. If the military becomes and stays allied
with society in the East European countries then it will be
extremely difficult for a disgruntled military leadership to
mobilize them alongside their former Soviet comrades.
There is a need to build nationalism and loyalty among the
professional cadres. At present there seems to be a window of
vulnerability to regression towards internationalism. It is
however steadily decreasing. The longer the time that the
democrats have to establish control over the professional
military cadres the safer they will be. Tactics of
depoliticization will take time to work. Hopefully the
opportunists will see that it is in their interest to
cooperate with the new regimes. While they are cooperating, a
younger, nationalistic cadre can be educated and prepared to
replace them. Military loyalty to the nation and the
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possibility for East European military support of a Western
oriented security policy will take some time.
The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and
the issue of continued Soviet military leverage over the
region seems closely linked. Questions of equipment
dependency, habits of collaboration, and sympathies between
some East European military leaders and their former Soviet
comrades, are of secondary importance. Over time these levers
will decay. Even at the present time it is hard to imagine
that these avenues for Soviet military pressure might
influence the East Europeans. The continuing presence of
Soviet troops in Poland and Germany is however, a much
stronger motivator for the countries involved. Germany can
counterweight this with its NATO membership and should be
fairly secure against deliberate Soviet military pressure. The
issue of a spontaneous conflict between portions of the GSFG
and local Germans is another matter. If ignited by an
aggressive Soviet military response x to protect its troops'
the Germans would be in quite a bind. Poland, not having NATO
membership like Germany, has only domestic opinion to counter
Soviet military pressures. The fact that all the other East
European countries have negotiated Soviet troop withdrawal
accords to their satisfaction, except for the Poles
themselves, must be aggravating for the Polish populace and a
tender spot for the government because of its delay in
concluding an accord. However, once Soviet troops are gone
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from these countries there would is no way in which the Soviet
military by itself could enforce its desired worldview.
95
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance Gorbachev and the conservatives bedding
down together seemed irreversible, and an indication of a
retrograde move towards older policies. The superficial
similarities between the 1991 Baltic crackdown and those of
'53, '56, and '68 seemed to portend another expansion of the
iron curtain and danger for East European freedom. Only upon
closer examination was it discovered that the Baltic
repression of January 1991 had more in common with: Kazakhstan
in December 1986, Georgia in April 1990, Kokand - Uzbekistan
in August 1989, Azerbaijan in January 1990, and Tadzhikistan
in February 1990, [Ref . 355] than it did with the
crackdowns in Eastern Europe. The * Gorbachev
Doctrine' [Ref . 356] applied to the USSR and not to
Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding the conservative tack, as
regards Eastern Europe Gorbachev had not undergone an abrupt
*on the road to Damascus' change of heart. The x turn to the
right' was not indicative of a change of position on East
European independence, but a reaction to internal Soviet
developments. Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze both
thought that Gorbachev has not abandoned perestroika and new
thinking. "Both expressed the view that Gorbachev's
conservative policies are tactical-the result of having to
deal with the political and economic crisis while accomodating
mounting pressure from the conservatives. " [Ref . 357]
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Gorbachev's role in recent Soviet developments is not
therefore an indication that he would be an obstacle to
ameliorating European security. Shevardnadze may have been the
builder of new thinking in Europe, he may have been its most
visible proponent, but Gorbachev was its architect. For
example, Shevardnadze negotiated the CFE arms control treaty,
but it was Gorbachev who overruled Soviet military objections
to it [Ref. 358], Responsibility for the repressive
internal x Gorbachev Doctrine' rests with Gorbachev but credit
for the external x Sinatra Doctrine' must rest with him as
well. The East Europeans could not very well have gone their
own way without his acquiescence. The leader who approved NATO
membership for the USSR's greatest historical enemy, Germany,
does not seem to have changed his position on Europe. While
Gorbachev might not approve of certain Western leaning
scenarios; such as NATO membership for Poland, Czechoslovakia,
or Hungary; and while he might bargain to attain concessions
for the Soviet side as costs for Soviet approval of such
moves; his recent political maneuverings hold nothing that
might lead one to believe that he would steadfastly hold out
against such possibilities.
All of this is good news for Western arms control
desiderata, and European stability. However, given the Soviet
predicament one is forced to ask about Gorbachev's continued
tenure in office. Soviet instability, calls for Gorbachev's
resignation from the right [Ref. 359], and from
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striking coal miners [Ref. 360], and the worsening
nationalities crisis, support the idea that he might lose his
post. On the other hand, he could conceivably remain in office
but be stripped of effective power. It is impossible to say
how long Gorbachev might remain in power. The fact that he has
weathered so many controversies so far is indicative of his
tactical political ability. He has shown himself able to use
the liberals (in the early stages of perestroika) and the
conservatives (more recently) to further his aims and his
tenure. This political dexterity would seem to mitigate for
his continued retention of power. On the other hand, critics
might say that he has survived so long that his time must soon
be up.
However, just recently he was able to command the
allegiance of the Communist Party despite virulent attacks
against him, and this at a special session of the Central
Committee called specifically to lambast him and his policies
[Ref. 361] . Likewise he was able to overcome
seemingly intractable differences between himself and the
republican leaders to fashion a compromise that would
alleviate the threat to his leadership brought on by the coal
miners' strike [Ref. 362]. The central - republican
authority rapprochement not only assuaged the miners' crisis
but has led the way for a possible resolution of the crisis of
power in the USSR. A new constitution, new union treaty and
new power wielding organs may emerge as a result
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[Ref. 363]. Whether such a stabilization of power
occurs or not, it is still impossible to say if Gorbachev will
be in a position to influence events. Looking at his past
record one has to be impressed with his ability to accommodate
change, make adjustments, and survive politically. Given this,
it seems more likely than not that Gorbachev will be in a
position to exercise his relatively benevolent view of the
world.
Gorbachev's position, for however long he holds it, and
his views on Europe may not run counter to Western diplomatic
efforts; but the conservative stance certainly does. Despite
their collaboration over aspects of the Baltic crackdown,
Gorbachev and the conservatives remain opposed on seemingly
almost every issue. He has little support in the conservative
corner [Ref. 364], The most recent evidence of
discord was the Central Committee meeting called by the
conservatives to criticize Gorbachev and his policies. The
meeting seemed to have been called in a bid to unseat
Gorbachev [Ref. 365]. The President, however, has
one-upped his conservative opposition by offering to resign,
as some of them demanded, only to have the Central Committee
move to ignore the resignation offer by a vote of 322 to 13
with 14 abstentions [Ref. 366] .
All in all Gorbachev seems to be handling the conservative
opposition with skill. He did an end run around conservative
calls for his ouster, and he also upstaged their mobilization
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with his surprise announcement of the accord with the
republican leaders. "Mr. Gorbachev meant for this new
initiative [the Moscow-republics accord] to pre-empt the
closed meeting of some of his critics on the Communist Party
Central Committee that began today [24 April 1991] in the
Kremlin.
"
[Ref. 367] Despite the so-called % turn to the right',
Gorbachev seems to be maintaining his distance from the
conservatives
.
Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov seems to be cut from the
same cloth as his conservative predecessor
[Ref. 368], Nikolai Ryzhkov. Pavlov seems to have
the same conservative support that Ryzhkov had. "The coalition
of forces supporting Ryzhkov includes the bulk of the party
and government bureaucracy, the senior ranks of the armed
forces, and what Soviet commentators describe as "the
military-industrial complex." Aggressive lobbying by the
directors of many Soviet factories who fear production would
be disrupted by too rapid a shift to a market economy helped
stave off demands for Ryzhkov' s resignation earlier this
fall. "[Ref. 369] Subsequently Ryzhkov suffered a
heart attack [Ref. 370]. The Prime Minister's
position seems to be held by the conservative lobby, in that
the new Prime Minister, Pavlov, holds similar conservative
views on the economy. He called for "old style coercion" to
stop strikes and said that, "Soldiers or police "cannot make
anyone work... But by applying force, you can give people the
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possibility to work. "" [Ref . 371] Gorbachev had
little to say about these comments. He is holding his distance
while using the conservatives, Pavlov in this case, to get
things done. Pavlov signed a decree banning demonstrations to
undercut the massive pro-Yeltsin rally planned for 2 8 March
1991 [Ref. 372]. 50,000 troops were called out to
oppose the demonstration but did nothing when it was held
[Ref. 373]. This phony show of force undercut the
conservatives, while Gorbachev's aides were letting it be
known that Gorbachev had nothing to do with the situation and
that all the blame rested on Pavlov's shoulders
[Ref. 374].
As noted in Chapter II in the Baltic crackdown, Gorbachev
gives the conservatives enough leeway to have them discredit
themselves by their methods, enabling him to portray himself
as the best moderate alternative. During the political
maneuvering of the Central Committee meeting in April of 1991
Gorbachev "capitalized on the attack from the right to portray
himself as the embattled champion of the
center.
"
[Ref . 375] Gorbachev seems to be getting the
upper hand in his most recent struggles with the conservative
lobby.
In the Foreign Ministry/Defense Ministry struggle over
arms control, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and the new
thinkers seemed to have gotten the upper hand over the
military conservatives. While Defense Minister Yazov was
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telling Former President Nixon that the CFE treaty provisions
were "one-sided and unfair" [Ref. 376], the Foreign
Ministry was trading away the Soviet position on coastal
defense forces [Ref. 377]. Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh was Secretary of State Baker's counterpart in the
talks and not General Moiseev [Ref. 378]. Yet,
several weeks later it was announced that General Moiseev
would be coming to Washington to clear up the remaining
obstacles to agreement on the treaty [Ref. 379]
Perhaps the Foreign and Defense Ministries have come to some
balance in their influence on foreign policy and specifically
arms control policy. If so, it remains hard to believe that
this stasis will be more than temporary. However, both the
Foreign Ministry initiative and the Moiseev trip are at least
indicative of a desire to appear conciliatory. This even if
the Moiseev trip achieved nothing. The fact that the Soviet
side was willing to compromise on its earlier intractable
position with regard to the redesignation of units as naval
forces point to a more forthcoming Soviet foreign policy.
The Defense Ministry was criticized for its handling of
the crackdown in the Baltics [Ref. 380] . Its
handling of arms control, the attendant lack of progress
therein, and the worsening of relations with the United States
[Ref. 381] , must also have been reasons for
criticism of the Defense Ministry. In any event the removal of
the naval redesignation logjam from the CFE treaty process,
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and the apparent lack of senior military participation, point
to the end of temporary Soviet military ascendancy over the
new thinkers. The struggle between the two camps will
certainly continue.
Of the continued political machinations of the military,
one author warns, "International experience has shown that
once they taste political power, generals are hard to drive
back to the barracks. This fact cannot be ignored.
"
[Ref. 382]
While the conservative lobby was getting trounced by Gorbachev
at the April Central Committee special meeting, and while the
Foreign Ministry was undoing the Soviet military arms control
position, Soviet troops broke into and seized at least 12
buildings in 8 Lithuanian cities [Ref. 383].
Military power might be more circumscribed in the foreign
policy and political infighting arenas but it has certainly
continued to enjoy free reign in the Baltics. The Gorbachev
cabinet denied that the special mission police unit, OMON,
used in Lithuania acts under its orders [Ref. 384].
OMON's commander in Vilnius, Capt. Boleslav Makutinovich,
revealed that his unit was supplied and directed by the
Interior Ministry under Boris Pugo [Ref. 385] . Pugo
equivocated about the ties between his ministry and OMON
[Ref. 386].
Despite the retrenchment of military power in some areas,
and despite statements to the contrary, Gorbachev seems to be
using the conservative instruments of power where his aims and
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those of the right are congruent, namely in the repression of
radical moves to dismember the union. The conservatives will
continue to play a role in defining policy options for as long
as they are needed to help maintain order. Unlike the period
before the x turn to the right' when he relied on reformist
elements, Gorbachev cannot completely ignore conservative
opinion because he needs their support against an overly rapid
disintegration of the union.
The conservative end of the Soviet political spectrum will
pose a threat to European stability for as long as they are
needed to moderate the internal play of events in the Soviet
Union. Because the conservative organs were needed to preserve
the union, they have gained influence internally. They have
also gained in external policy making. Because of this
increased voice in international affairs, the Soviet right
cannot be dismissed. Charles Gati outlined the right's hope
for Eastern Europe.
"The Party, military and K.G.B. . . .hope the Central
European experiment with pluralism and the free market
fails. That would fortify their case against perestroika.
If Poland is mired in strikes, Hungary consumed by
nationalist passions and Czechoslovakia torn by strife
between Czechs and Slovaks, the conservatives could say to
Soviet citizens: Is this what you want? ...Soviet die-
hards want more tension, more disorder. Their road to
power at home is paved with Central European instability.
Thus, though to a far lesser extent than before, the




The destabilizing role played by a continued Soviet troop
presence in Eastern Europe has been noted. The KGB also could
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play a role in destabilization. U.S. intelligence and defense
officials have been attributed with statements asserting that
ties are being maintained between remnants of the East
European secret services and the KGB [Ref. 388], The
new head of the Czechoslovak Office for the Protection of the
Constitution and Democracy, Jiri Novotny, "confirmed that some
of the former StB [Czechoslovakia's version of the KGB]
members are being hired by foreign intelligence services to
operate against Czechoslovakia. Their number is said to be
high enough to warrant action [Ref. 389] While the
KGB is not specifically mentioned, it is not hard to imagine
that the Czechoslovaks are reluctant to antagonize their
powerful and overbearing neighbor. A Czech parliamentary
commission reported that StB, "collaborators may continue to
keep their old contacts, either out of fear of extortion or
fear of being exposed. "[Ref. 390] These
collaborators seem to be widely spread through the governing
organs of the country [Ref. 391]. If the Czech case
is any example, the East European countries are penetrated
through and through by informants which might be used by the
KGB. As with the process of nationalizing the loyalties of the
East European militaries, the process of ridding the new
regimes of disloyal elements and of socializing the rest to
nationalist ideals will take time. Until such time as these
processes engender results, remnants of the old regime will
offer avenues for destabilization to the Soviet hard-liners.
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The picture that has emerged of the x Turn to the Right' is
not one of unmitigated disaster for hopes of European
stability and superpower agreement. Gorbachev's move was
tactical and temporary. His political survival, while always
questionable, seems fairly comfortable for the short term. The
vicissitudes of the reformist-conservative struggle mean that
prospects for harmonious relations will look more or less
favorable depending upon who is on top. At this writing the
reformers seem to have regained the initiative. If Soviet
troops were already gone from Central Europe, and if the
democracies there were less vulnerable, one would be inclined
to think that it would be a good time to push more forcefully
for Western policies. This situation not yet being the case,
a more cautious stance is required.
However, the strength of Soviet conservatives, while
perhaps momentarily checked, coupled with the levers of the
Soviet troop presence, and ties between the Soviet military
and KGB and their East European counterparts all militate
against aggressive Western initiatives. The new democracies
need to be strengthened against the day when they are subject
to a Soviet conservative backlash over * joining' Europe. John
Lewis Gaddis noted of the Marshall Plan, "its main purpose was
to shift the expectations of its recipients from the belief
that things could only get worse to the conviction that they
would eventually get better" and that this is what the West
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needs to do in the present situation [Ref. 392]. The
West must not let the East Europeans feel abandoned in their
search for democracy and security. The door to NATO, as
Valclav Havel noted, must remain open for the East European
nations [Ref. 393]. Until such time as Soviet troops
are gone the East European states and NATO can expand their
ties and cooperation. Care will have to be taken however not
to give the Soviet conservatives ammunition in their fight
against East European rapprochement with the West. The Soviet
military should not be made to think that they are withdrawing
as losers to be replaced by NATO moving in on their retreating
heels.
The x Turn to the Right' is not an indication that the USSR
has set a conservative course. It is an indication that the
policies of 1988, 89, and 90 will not continue as before. The
new thinkers and the conservatives seem more evenly matched
now. The breakneck pace of East-West diplomacy has slowed
down. The new pace is likely to be one of fits and starts as
one and the other camp gains and looses ascendancy in foreign
policy. Arms control negotiations are and will be more
difficult now. Eastern Europe is likely to have some anxious
moments from time to time as its large neighbor embraces and
then backs off from conservative positions. In the short-term
conservative influence in the USSR's European policy will
depend on the continued troop presence in Germany and Poland.
For the mid-term the reformists seem strong enough to
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counterbalance the Soviet generals with occasional tilts to
one side or the other. As for the long term, the empire
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